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I. INTRODUCTION
Home ownership is the American dream.1  The federal
government has played a significant role in promoting this dream
1. See President Bill Clinton, Radio Address to the Nation on the Economic Plan,
29 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 331,332 (Feb. 27, 1993) (stating that home ownership is "an
essential part of the American dream we're working hard to restore"); I President George
Bush, Remarks on Arrival in Appleton, Wisconsin, 1992-93 PuB. PAPERS 1188, 1188 (July
27, 1992) ("I believe that those on welfare, what they really want is a piece of the American
dream: homeownership, a good job, opportunities for their children, and strong, loving
families."); 1 President Ronald Reagan, Remarks at the Midyear Meeting of the National
Association of Realtors, 1984 PuB. PAPERS 675, 677 (May 10, 1984) ("1 firmiy believe that
the opportunity to own a home is part of the American dream."); President Lyndon Johnson,
Message to Congress on the Crisis of the Cities (Feb. 26, 1968) ("Home ownership is a
cherished dream and achievement of most Americans."), reprinted in 114 CONG. REC. 3956,
3957 (1968); see also President Franklin Roosevelt, Address to the United States Savings
and Loan League (Nov. 16, 1942), quoted in N.Y. TMES, Nov. 17, 1942, at 35 ("[A] nation
of home owners, of people who own a real share in their own land, is unconquerable."); 78
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since the 1930s. 2 In recent years, however, Congress has enacted
legislation that either encourages homeowners to borrow against the
equity3 in their homes or overbroadly supports home equity
mortgage markets as well as purchase money mortgage markets.4
This legislation is putting the American dream in jeopardy. Consider
the plight of Mary and Gary Dunckel.
5
The Dunckels and their two daughters live in Laingsburg,
Michigan, a small town just outside Lansing. They purchased their
home, located on ten acres of land, in 1977 for $25,000 on an
installment land contract carrying an interest rate of 8 percent and
requiring monthly payments of $180. In 1987, Gary was laid off
from his high-paying job connected with the automobile industry and
took a lower paying job managing a store that sold marine
recreational equipment. Mary was employed full-time at the same
store; so when the business failed in October of 1991, the family was
left with only Mary's income from a part-time "second" job. About
the same time, Gary's elderly parents, who had lent them more than
$10,000 over the years, needed to be repaid. The Dunckels, unable
even to pay their monthly bills, decided that they needed a home
equity loan. The advantages of a home equity loan, as the Dunckels
saw it, included getting current creditors "off their backs," repaying
Gary's parents, having one monthly payment rather than several, and
having a federal income tax deduction for interest paid on the loan.
The Dunckels found a mortgage broker who represented a
lender willing to make them a loan despite their bleak financial
condition,6 but only on extremely undesirable terms. Although the
Dunckels' home was appraised at $57,000, the lender was willing to
lend them only $31,000. The interest rate on the new loan was 19.9
percent at a time when purchase money mortgage loans were
CONG. REC. 11,182 (1934) (statement of Rep. Sirovich) ('The home is the foundation of all
society.").
2. See infra part 111.
3. Equity is "[t]he difference between the fair market value and debt in property."
BLACK'S LAw DIcrIoNARY 540 (6th ed. 1990).
4. See infra part IV.
5. The story of the Dunckels is true. I learned of the Dunckels' dilemma from
Gary's sister-in-law, who was my research assistant. I obtained the facts of the Dunckels'
story by telephone interview with Gary in January 1994.
6. By the time the loan was closed in February 1992, both Gary and Mary were
working part-time.
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available for under 9 percent.7 The lender required the Dunckels to
pay off all their existing debts from the loan proceeds, including their
installment land contract, which carried an 8 percent interest rate.
The Dunckels paid over $3000 in closing costs,8 and their monthly
house payment jumped from $180 to $521 per month, including
principal and interest only.
The Dunckels took a substantial risk by pledging their home to
secure a loan with payments they could scarcely afford at a time
when their future income was uncertain. Had they fallen behind in
making their loan payments, the Dunckels' lender could have
foreclosed, taking their home and any remaining equity. Even a
bankruptcy filing would not have helped them retain possession of
the home if payments on the home equity loan were not affordable.
9
The Dunckels' lender, on the other hand, assumed little risk because
$26,000 of equity remained in the Dunckels' home. If the Dunckels
had defaulted on their loan, the lender probably would not have
incurred a loss due to the high yalue of the house in relation to the
loan amount.'0 As long as the Dunckels had continued to make
payments, the lender would have received more than a 20 percent
return on its investment. If the Dunckels had refinanced at a lower
interest rate, the lender would have received a return in excess of 20
percent on its investment."1 Surely the risk to the lender in this case
did not justify the high interest rate charged on the loan.
The plight of the Dunckels was caused, at least in part, by
federal laws that make home equity financing the preferred form of
consumer credit for both borrowers and lenders. One of the reasons
the Dunckels chose to obtain a home equity loan was the availability
7. See Tracking Home Mortgages, DAuAS MoRNING Naws, Feb. 21,1992, at Dll.
8. The Dunekels' closing costs included $1,550 in fees to the lender and broker.
Lenders typically charge up-front loan origination fees or discount fees, which are
sometimes referred to as "points." See Dale A. Whitman, Home Transfer Costs: An
Economic and LegalAnalysis, 62 GFo.L. . 1311, 1341 (1974). Since one point equals one
percent of the loan amount, id. at 1342, the Dunckels paid five points.
9. See infra part IVC.2.
10. The lender in this case had a 41% loan-to-value ratio. See infra notes 39-42 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the relationship between loan-to-value ratio and the
lender's risk of loss.
11. In fact, the earlier the Dunckels could pay off the loan, the higher would be the
lender's return on its investment because of the points paid at the time of closing. See
GRAN S. NELSON & DAE A. WHrMAN, CASES AmD MATEmAm ON REAL ESTATE TRANSFER,
FINANCE, AND DEvEopmNT 982-83 (4th ed. 1992); Whitman, supra note 8, at 1343.
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of a tax deduction for interest paid on a home equity loan and the
lack of a tax deduction for interest paid on other types of consumer
debt.12 Their lender may have been motivated by federal measures
favoring home equity financing, including federal preemption of
state usury laws applicable to first lien home equity loans and
preferential treatment given home equity lenders in bankruptcy. The
19.9 percent interest rate on the Dunckels' loan was permissible only
because it was secured by a first lien on their home.13  Current
bankruptcy law would make it impossible for the Dunckels to obtain
relief in bankruptcy from the burden of payments on the home equity
loan and at the same time to retain possession of their home.'
4
While bankruptcy would provide little relief to the Dunckels now, it
might have been a better alternative during their financial crisis than
a high interest rate home equity loan.
15
This Article focuses on home equity loans, which will be
defimed as loans secured by a homeowner's residence other than
loans used solely to purchase or construct the residence, to refinance
a purchase money loan, or to make home improvements. 16 A home
12. See I.R.C. § 163(h) (1988).
13. Federal law preempts state usury ceilings for most loans secured by a first lien
on residential real estate. See infra part IV.B.1. In addition, Michigan law provides that any
interest rate is permissible on a first lien mortgage loan made by a lender "approved as a
mortgagee under the national housing act.., or regulated by the state or by a federal
agency." MIcH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 438.31(c)(2), (5) (West Supp. 1994-95).
14. See infra part IV.C.2.
15. Because the Dunckels owed a substantial sum to Gary's parents and wanted to
repay this debt, bankruptcy would not have been as desirable to them as it might be to other
debtors in a comparable situation.
16. Home improvement loans are not the primary focus of this Article because of
special problems associated with home improvement loans and the special regulations
governing them. E.g., 16 C.F.R. 433.1-.2 (1994); see ROBERT J. HoBBs ET AL., NATIONAL
CONSUMER LAW CENTER, CONsuMER PROBLEMS WITH HOME EQuTY SCMs, SECOND
MORTGAGES, AND HOME EQUrrY LINES OF CREDrr 2 (Am. Ass'n of Retired Persons 1989);
Kathleen Keest, Spiking and Loan-Splitting in Home Improvement Financing: Artful
Dodges, 26 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 415, 415-21 (1992). In addition, a home improvement
loan is to some extent more in the nature of a purchase money loan because it is designed to
increase the value of the home and therefore provides funds for investment rather than for
consumption. See HOBBS ET AL, supra, at 2.
This Article also does not focus on home equity conversion loans because of the
special policy considerations involved. Home equity conversion loans permit elderly
homeowners with insufficient income to convert home equity into income and therefore to
remain in their homes rather than being forced to sell them. See Joan E. Fairbanks, Home
Equity Conversion Programs: A Housing Option for the "House-Rich, Cash-Poor"
1994]
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equity loan may be secured by a second, third, or other junior
mortgage on a residence, or by a first mortgage when the purchase
money loan has been paid off or is being refinanced as a part of the
home equity loan. Home equity lines of credit, 17 which are
revolving credit loans secured by a lien on a home, are included
within the meaning of the term "home equity loan" as used in this
Article.
In this Article, I advocate elimination of federal promotion of
home equity financing, recommending that the federal government
permit home equity financing without encouraging it. In Part HI of
this Article, I discuss some of the problems caused by federal
promotion of home equity financing. While home equity loans carry
a risk to the borrowers of losing their homes, homeowners cannot
properly assess this risk due to their tendency to underestimate the
probability of default and foreclosure.' 8 Homeowners who do lose
their homes to foreclosure may be devastated, both financially and
psychologically.19 Despite the risks of a home equity loan, the total
amount of home equity debt has increased drastically in recent years
due, in part, to the deductibility of home equity interest under federal
tax law.20 In addition, as a result of federal preemption of state
consumer protection measures such as usury statutes, predatory
lenders have been permitted to victimize homeowners in low-income
neighborhoods and homeowners who, like the Dunckels, are in
severe financial distress.21 Because of special privileges given to
home equity lenders under bankruptcy law, home equity borrowers
may not be able find relief in bankruptcy.
22
In Part III of this Article, I discuss the federal government's
home ownership policy because an understanding of the federal
Elderly, 23 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 481, 485 (1989); Bruce Jacobs, The National Potential of
Home Equity Conversion, 26 GERONToLOGIST 496,496-97 (1986).
17. The home equity line of credit is a relatively new credit device. See U.S.
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, TAX PouCyx MANY FACTORS CONTRIBUTED TO THE GROWTH
IN HOME EQUrrY FINANCING IN THE 1980s 3 (1993) [hereinafter GAO REPORTI]. Home
equity lines of credit provide credit that can be borrowed, repaid, and borrowed again on a
revolving basis. They typically have a variable interest rate and no fixed term, in many cases
only requiring payment of interest each month. Id.
18. See infra notes 46-57 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 58-62 and accompanying text.
20. See infra part II.A.
21. See infra part l.C.
22. See infra part IV.C.2.
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measures that promote home equity financing requires a
comprehension of their relationship to measures that promote home
ownership. In Part IV, I examine both the means by which the
federal government encourages home equity financing under current
law and the effects of these measures. In Part V, I weigh competing
federal policies affected by home equity financing and propose the
adoption of several measures designed to achieve a more appropriate
balance. First, tax law should be changed to eliminate the deduction
for home equity interest so that all consumer interest is
nondeductible, regardless of whether it is secured by a lien on a
home. Second, federal preemption of state usury ceilings on home
equity loans should be eliminated so that states can regulate interest
rates on home equity loans. Finally, bankruptcy law should be
amended to permit homeowners in bankruptcy to modify their home
equity loans as is permitted with other types of secured debt.
II. PROBLEMS OF FEDERAL PRoMOTIoN OF HOME EQUTrY
FINANCING
Congresswoman Cardiss Collins best summed up the problem
with federal promotion of home equity financing when she said: "[I]f
owning a home is the American dream, then the threat of losing that
home is the American nightmare."23 Because home equity loans
create a risk for borrowers of losing their homes, 24 the federal
government is promoting the nightmare by encouraging borrowers to
mortgage their homes and lenders to require home mortgage liens.
A. Recent Growth of Home Equity Financing
The total amount of outstanding home equity indebtedness has
grown significantly in recent years, increasing from $60 billion in
1981 to $357 billion in 1991. 25 During the same period, non-
23. Mortgage Delinquencies and Defaults: Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the
House Comm. on Government Operations, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1982).
24. See GAO REPORT, supra note 17, at 17.
25. Id. at 12-14. The totals are in "1991 dollars." Id. at 7.
The GAO Report defines the term "home equity loan" differently from the way in
which the term is used in this Article. See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text. The
Report appears to include all second liens within the term even if they are purchase money
second liens, see GAO REPor, supra note 17, app. II, at 52, and to exclude any refinance of
a first lien purchase money loan even if the borrower liquidated home equity to be used for
1994]
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housing consumer debt grew at a significantly lower rate.26 Factors
contributing to the growth of home equity financing include changes
in the tax law that encourage borrowers to choose the home equity
loan as the vehicle for consumer borrowing,2 7 appreciation in home
values,28 deregulation of banks and savings and loans,29 amendments
to the Truth in Lending Act,3° and aggressive marketing tactics by
lenders. 31 The growth of debt in the form of home equity lines of
other purposes or included existing home equity loans in the refinance, see id. at 8-9. The
amount of home equity financing as defined in this Article therefore may be more-due to
equity liquidated in connection with refinance-or less-due to home improvement loans
and purchase money second liens-than reported by the GAO.
Since 1991, the number of home equity loans has declined. See Diane Crispell, People
Patterns, WAU. ST. J., Feb. 7, 1994, at B 1. A poll conducted by Bank Advertising News and
the Gallup Organization indicated that 20% of all homeowners had home equity loans in
1993, down from 34% in 1990. Id. One analyst indicated that the decline was not
statistically significant. Id. The decline may be related to the number of refinancings of
home mortgage debt during the early 1990s since homeowners can draw down home equity
in connection with refinancing and can wrap existing home equity loans into the refinancing.
GAO R'oRr, supra note 17, at 8.
26. While home equity debt grew at an average annual rate of approximately 20%
per year between 1981 and 1991, other consumer debt grew by only 4% per year. GAO
REPOR, supra note 17, at 1.
27. See id. at 1; see also infra part IVA.2.
28. GAO REPORT, supra note 17, at 1.
29. Id. at 19. The Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, Pub. L.
No. 97-320, 96 Stat. 1469 (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.), gave national banks
and federally chartered savings associations expanded authority to make home equity loans.
The Act simplified statutes authorizing real estate lending by national banks, see id. § 403,
96 Stat. at 1510, and permitted savings associations to make real estate loans without
limitations on loan-to-value ratios, see id. § 322, 96 Stat. at 1499. In addition, the
Alternative Mortgage Transaction Parity Act, Title VII of the Gam-St. Germain Act,
preempted state laws restricting the ability of nonfederally chartered institutions to make
alternative mortgage loans including reverse annuity mortgages and line of credit conversion
mortgages. See id. §§ 801-803, 96 Stat. at 1545-46; see also infra notes 149-154 and
accompanying text. The Federal Home Loan Bank Board had authorized federal savings
associations to make reverse annuity mortgage loans in 1978. See 43 Fed. Reg. 59,336,
59,336 (1978).
30. GAO REPORT, supra note 17, at 19. The Truth in Lending Act, Pub. L. No. 90-
321, 82 Stat. 146 (1968) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1635 (1988)), initially gave
borrowers a three-day right of rescission each time they drew down on a home equity line of
credit. See id. tit. I, § 125, 82 Stat. at 152. Congress temporarily modified the Act in 1980
to give borrowers a right of rescission only at the time the line of credit was initiated, Truth
in Lending Simplification and Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 96-221, tit. VI, § 612(a)(6), 94 Stat.
168, 176 (1980) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1635(e) (1988)), and made the amendment
permanent in 1984, Housing and Community Development Technical Amendments Act,
Pub. L. No. 98-479, tit. II, § 205, 98 Stat. 2227, 2234 (1984) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1635
(e) (1988)).
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credit has been more dramatic than the growth of traditional home
equity loans.32 Home equity lines of credit were uncommon prior to
the early 1980s,33 but they have grown in availability as well as
popularity since that time.34
B. Risks of Home Equity Financing
A home equity loan, because it is secured by a lien on the
borrower's home, creates a risk to the borrower of losing the home.
35
The National Consumer Law Center estimates that home equity
loans have caused or expedited half of all home mortgage
foreclosures in recent years.36 Some of the most significant factors
that contribute to mortgage delinquency and foreclosure are: (1) a
loan purpose other than purchase money; (2) the existence of junior
financing; and (3) a high loan-to-value ratio.37 Each of these factors
31. GAO REPoRr, supra note 17, at 19. Lenders' preference for home equity
financing may result in part from the advantages provided under federal law to home equity
lenders. See infra parts IVB & C.1.
32. See GAO REPORT, supra note 17, at 8. Outstanding home equity line-of-credit
indebtedness grew from $1 billion in 1981 to $132 billion in 1991, while traditional home
equity indebtedness grew from $59 billion to $225 billion over the same period. kLa
33. Id. app. IV, at 67. They were uncommon because of restrictions on national
banks and federally chartered savings associations, and because the Truth in Lending Act
gave borrowers a three-day right of rescission each time they drew down on a home equity
line of credit. See supra notes 29-30.
34. Less than one percent of lenders offered home equity lines of credit in 1980, but
80% of banks and 65% of savings and loans offered the lines of credit by 1989. GAO
REPORT, supra note 17, app. IV, at 67.
35. See id. at 17.
36. Gary Klein, Preventing Foreclosures: Spotting Loan Scams Involving Low-
Income Homeowners, 27 CLEARINGHOuSE REv. 116, 117 (1993). In 1992, the delinquency
rate for traditional second lien home equity loans was 2.45%, a rate higher than that for all
consumer credit, excluding unsecured credit cards. CONSUMR BANKERS ASS'N, HOME
EQurry LOAN STUDY 15, 85 (1993). The delinquency rate for home equity lines of credit
was only 1.27%. kL The substantially lower rate for home equity lines of credit may be
attributable to the newness of this credit device, to the ability of borrowers to defer
delinquency by drawing down on the credit line to make interest payments, and to the higher
credit standards that lenders have required for line-of-credit borrowers. GAO REPORT, supra
note 17, at 20. The ability of borrowers to defer delinquency on a relatively new credit
device would make the low delinquency rate somewhat misleading. In fact, the delinquency
rate for home equity lines of credit has increased every year since 1988. See id.
37. See JOHN P. HERzoG & JAMES S. EARLEY, HOME MORTGAGE DELNQUENCY AND
FORECLOSURE at xvii-xix (1970). Many studies have found that a high loan-to-value ratio is
one of the most significant factors in determining the risk of mortgage delinquency or
foreclosure, but these studies did not evaluate loan purpose or the existence of junior
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would tend to be present or exacerbated in the case of a home equity
loan, 38 which explains the relationship between home equity
financing and the increased risk of foreclosure.
While home equity loans are risky for homeowners, who may
lose their homes if they default in making payments, they are not
particularly risky for lenders. 39 A home equity lender sustains a loss
only if the borrower defaults, the sale of the home at or after
foreclosure produces an amount insufficient to pay the debt and the
lender's costs, and the lender cannot collect the deficiency.4 0 When
a lender has a junior lien, the lender risks foreclosure by a prior
lienholder; however, because the lender has a right to purchase any
prior lien loan 4 the lender is ultimately protected if the value of the
home is sufficient to cover both debts. Therefore, home equity loans
with a low loan-to-value ratio are low-risk loans for lenders.
There are sound reasons from a lender's perspective for
requiring a lien on a borrower's home as a prerequisite to an
extension of credit. First, the home provides an alternate source of
financing as contributing factors. See, e.g., Robert J. Aalberts & Douglas S. Bible,
Mortgage Default in Louisiana: An Empirical Study of Recent Foreclosures on Residential
Property in Caddo Parish, 15 S.U. L. REV. 215,219 (1988); Tim S. Campbell & J. Kimball
Dietrich, The Determinants of Default on Insured Conventional Residential Mortgage
Loans, 38 J. FIN. 1569, 1580 (1983); George M. von Furstenberg & R. Jeffrey Green,
Estimation of Delinquency Risk for Home Mortgage Portfolios, 2 AM. REAL EST. & URB.
ECON. ASS'N J. 5, 12 (1974); Jerry R. Jackson & David L. Kasserman, Default Risk on
Home Mortgage Loans: A Test of Competing Hypotheses, 47 J. RIsK & INS. 678, 686
(1980).
38. The study by Professors Herzog and Earley showed refinancings, which were
defined to include loans that provided funds for purposes other than repaying existing
indebtedness, to have higher delinquency and foreclosure rates than home purchase-money
loans. HERZOG & EARLEY, supra note 37, at xvii-xix. The study did not cover second lien
loans other than loans for repair, id at 79, but did indicate that the existence of a junior lien,
such as a home equity loan, increases the risk of default and foreclosure for the first lien
loan, id at xvii-xix. Finally, borrowing against the equity in a home decreases the
homeowner's equity, increasing the total loan-to-value ratio. The study found that loans
with high loan-to-value ratios had higher delinquency and foreclosure rates. Id,
39. This is especially true when the home equity loan has a floating interest rate so
that the borrower takes the risk of fluctuating interest rates. See Home Equity Loans:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Affairs of the Senate Comm. on Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 35 (1987) [hereinafter Hearing on
Home Equity Loans] (statement of Alan Fox, Consumer Fed'n of Am.).
40. See GRAw S. NELSON & DALE A. WHMAN, REAL ESTATE FiNANCE LAw § 11.2,
at 772 (3d ed. 1994). This explains why the loan-to-value ratio of a mortgage loan is one of
the most important factors in determining the lender's risk. HERZOG & EARLEY, supra note
37, at xvii-xix; NELSON & WHrTMAN, supra, at 772-73.
41. See NELSON & WHrrMAN, supra note 40, § 7.2, at 468-71.
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payment in the event that the borrower defaults.42 In addition, the
risk of losing the home may provide the motivation necessary to
keep the borrower from defaulting in the first place, because many
borrowers let other debts go unpaid while religiously making a home
mortgage payment each month. Even homeowners in bankruptcy
will go to great lengths to continue making home mortgage
payments.
43
There are also legitimate reasons why a homeowner might
choose to secure consumer debt with a lien on a home despite the
risk of losing the home. Since a lender may be unwilling to make an
unsecured loan, a homeowner might choose to grant a lien on a
home as a means to obtain credit that would not otherwise be
available. In addition, credit secured by a home may be available at
a lower interest rate or for a longer term than unsecured credit.44 In
some cases, these benefits may outweigh the disadvantages of a
home equity loan. These disadvantages include higher closing costs
of a home equity loan, delays in obtaining financing, and the risk of
losing the home.45 However, homeowners may not be able to
properly assess the risk of placing liens on their homes to secure
consumer loans.
The risk of losing a home to foreclosure is a risk that
homeowners are likely to discount.46 Empirical studies show that
people tend to underestimate the occurrence of some low-probability,
high-loss events,47 such as the loss of a home to foreclosure. In
42. See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
43. See TERESA A. StLuvAN, ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY L. WESTBROOK, As WE
FORGIVE OUR DEBTORS: BANKRUTrcY AND CONSUMER CREDIT IN AMERICA 134-35 (1989).
Some debtors go so far as to try to keep their bankruptcy a secret from their home mortgage
lender. Id; see also infra note 309.
44. AmERiCAN BANKERS Ass'N, WHaT YOU SHOULD KNOW ABOur HOME EQUITY
LOANS, reprinted in Hearing on Home Equity Loans, supra note 39, at 62, 63; GAO
REPoR, supra note 17, at 17.
45. AmERICAN BANKERS ASS'N, supra note 44, reprinted in Hearing on Home
Equity Loans, supra note 39, at 62-63; GAO REPORT, supra note 17, at 17-18.
46. See Michael H. Schill, An Economic Analysis of Mortgagor Protection Laws, 77
VA. L. REv. 489,530 (1991).
47. See KENNmr S. ABRAHAM, DmISRBtrnNG RISK 22 (1986); HowARD
KuNREuTHER, DISASTER INSURANCE PROTECTION 185-86 (1978); Paul Slovic et al.,
Preference for Insuring Against Probable Small Losses: Insurance Implications, 44 J. RISK
ASSESSMENT 237, 253 (1977); Neil D. Weinstein et al., Promoting Remedial Response to the
Risk of Radon: Are Information Campaigns Enough?, 14 ScI. TECH. & HUM. VALUES 360,
1994]
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assessing the probability of the occurrence of an event, people use
heuristics, systematic guidelines that permit individuals to assimilate
complex data into simple alternatives.48 While heuristics make the
judgment process simple, they may lead to serious errors.
49
One of several heuristics that may be involved in a person's
underestimation of foreclosure risk is the "availability" heuristic.
The availability heuristic leads people to view an event as probable if
the event is easy to imagine or remember.50 Therefore, people tend
to judge as probable those events that occur frequently, have
occurred recently, or are highly publicized.5' Because loss of a home
to foreclosure occurs infrequently and is unlikely to receive a great
deal of publicity, homeowners tend to underestimate the likelihood
of its occurrence.
5 2
Another heuristic relevant to the underestimation of the
likelihood of foreclosure is called "anchoring." People typically
make judgments by reference to a starting point; the anchoring
370-71 (1989). But see Roger G. Noll & James E. Krier, Some Implications of Cognitive
Psychology for Risk Regulation, 19 J. LEGAL STuD. 747, 755 (1990) ("[P]eople behave as if
they think that low-probability events are more likely than their own beliefs about the
probabilities would suggest."). The results of various studies show that people buy more
insurance against moderate- or high-probability, low-loss events than against low-
probability, high-loss events. Slovic, supra, at 253.
48. Steven D. Hollon & Margaret R. Kriss, Cognitive Factors in Clinical Research
and Practice, 4 CLINcAL PSYCHOL Rv. 35,41 (1984).
49. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics
and Biases, in JuDGMENT UNDER UNCERrAunTy: HEummTxcs AND Bi sEs 3, 3 (Daniel
Kahneman et al. eds., 1982). One reason for erroneous decisions based on heuristics is that
perception of a risk can be more influential than the reality of the risk. Abraham H.
Wandersman & William K. Halman, Are People Acting Irrationally? Understanding
Public Concerns About Environmental Threats, 48 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 681, 683 (1993).
50. Paul Slovic et al., Facts Versus Fears: Understanding Perceived Risk, in
JuDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAnTr. HuRImcs AND BIASES, supra note 49, at 463, 465.
51. Id. For example, following wide publicity concerning asbestos, parents were
disturbed to learn of exposed asbestos in some New York public schools. Daniel Goleman,
Hidden Rules Often Distort Ideas of Risk, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 1, 1994, at Cl. In response to
the parents' fears, the schools delayed the beginning of the school year despite explanations
by health officials that the children were more likely to be hit by lightning than to die from
asbestos exposure. Id. The children were likely at greater risk playing in the streets during
the time the schools were closed to remove asbestos. I
52. See Schill, supra note 46, at 527. Publicity about the increased numbers of
home foreclosures occurring during the 1980s may have caused people to see foreclosure as
a more likely event. However, as mortgage foreclosure rates drop and news coverage
decreases, the availability heuristic will again cause people to underestimate the likelihood
of the occurrence of a foreclosure.
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heuristic tends to bias a person towards that starting point.53
Because of anchoring, people resist changing their evaluation of the
probability of an event even if pertinent new information becomes
available.54 Since most homeowners have successfully made their
mortgage payments in the past, anchoring may cause them to
overestimate the likelihood of successfully making each future
payment; thus, homeowners will tend to underestimate the risk of
foreclosure created by a home equity loan.
55
Another factor relevant to the underestimation of foreclosure
risk is "unrealistic optimism"--people's tendency to believe that
negative events will affect others but not themselves.56 This
optimism would tend to cause homeowners to estimate their own
risk of foreclosure as lower than a third party's risk. Moreover,
studies have found that the more control that individuals believe they
have in avoiding a risk-for example, making mortgage payments to
avoid foreclosure-the more optimistic they become about their
susceptibility to harm.57 Thus, homeowners are unable to properly
assess the risk of home equity financing.
Although homeowners tend to underestimate its likelihood,
foreclosure is a risk of home equity financing, and the loss of a home
to foreclosure can be both financially and psychologically
devastating. Financially, a homeowner may lose the remaining
equity in a home if the home is worth more than the outstanding debt
53. Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 49, at 14.
54. Noll & Krier, supra note 47, at 754.
55. See Thomas H. Jackson, The Fresh-Start Policy in Bankruptcy Law, 98 HAR. L.
REv. 1393, 1411-12 (1985); Schill, supra note 46, at 528; Robert E. Scott, Rethinking the
Regulation of Coercive Creditor Remedies, 89 COLUM. L. Rnv. 730,767 (1989).
56. Suzanne C. Sergstrom et al., Optimistic Bias Among Cigarette Smokers, 23 J.
APptED Soc. PsYcHOL 1606, 1615 (1993); Slovic et al., supra note 50, at 468; Neil D.
Weinstein, Why It Won't Happen to Me: Perceptions of Risk Factors and Susceptibility, 3
Hn~m PSYCHOL 431, 432 (1984) [hereinafter Weinstein, Why It Won't Happen]; Neil D.
Weinstein, Unrealistic Optimism About Future Life Events, 39 J. PERSONALTY & Soc.
PSYCHOL 806, 813 (1980); Dan Zakay, The Relationship Between the Probability Assessor
and the Outcomes of an Event as a Determiner of Subjective Probability, 53 ACrA PsYcoL.
271, 278 (1983). For example, despite the barrage of public health information about the
relationship between smoking and increased risks of cancer, lung disease, and heart disease,
smokers remain optimistic in assessing their individual risk. Sergstrom et al., supra, at
1615.
57. Weinstein, Why It Won't Happen, supra note 56, at 452; Dan Zakay, The
Influence of Perceived Event's Controllability on Its Subjective Occurrence Probability, 34
PsYcHoL REc. 233,238 (1983).
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encumbering it,5 8 or a homeowner in many states may face a
deficiency judgment if the proceeds of the foreclosure sale are
insufficient to satisfy the debt.59 Since lenders in some states may
buy a home at foreclosure for substantially less than its fair market
value, sell the house for significantly more, and still maintain a
deficiency suit against the borrower, borrowers can face both loss of
equity and a deficiency judgment.
60
In addition to financial problems caused by loss of a home to
foreclosure, homeowners must deal with intense psychological
pressure. Homeowners facing loss of a home are more likely to
confront physical and mental illness, suicide, crime, and family
problems. 6 1  Forced dislocation from a home, even without any
corresponding financial difficulties, may result in sadness,
depression, psychological distress, sleep loss, anger, and idealization
of the lost home.62 In the worst cases, homeowners who lose their
homes to foreclosure may end up homeless, but even for those who
58. See Alex M. Johnson Jr., Critiquing the Foreclosure Process: An Economic
Approach Based on the Paradigmatic Norms of Bankruptcy, 79 VA. L REV. 959, 966-67
(1993). Professor Johnson's hypothetical borrower, Karen Mortgagor, has $60,000 of equity
in her home, but she is unlikely to receive any proceeds from a foreclosure sale of the home.
See id. A borrower typically will lose any existing equity in a foreclosure because the lender
has little or no incentive to bid more than the amount of the debt and because third parties
rarely purchase at foreclosure sale. See id. at 968-71.
59. See id. at 967. Many states impose limitations on the right of a mortgage lender
to seek a deficiency judgment, with limitations ranging from procedural requirements to
anti-deficiency statutes. See NELSON & WHrrMAN, supra note 40, §§ 8.1-8.3, at 579-609.
Anti-deficiency statutes may prohibit a deficiency judgment altogether under certain
circumstances or limit the amount of a deficiency to the difference between the debt and the
value of the foreclosed property. 1d. § 8.3, at 586-90.
60. See Johnson, supra note 58, at 966-67. In states with anti-deficiency legislation
or a statutory right of redemption, a lender has little incentive to make a low-ball bid. Id. at
967-68.
61. See Mortgage Foreclosures: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Financial
Institutions Supervision, Regulation and Insurance of the House Comn on Banking,
Finance and Urban Affairs, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 276 (1983) (statement of John J. Sheehan,
Director of Legis., United Steelworkers of Am.).
62. See Marc Fried, Grieving for a Lost Home: Psychological Costs of Relocation,
in URBAN RmEWAL: THIr REcoRD AND Tm CoNTRovERsY 359, 359-61 (James Q. Wilson
ed., 1966). This study dealt with urban slum dwellers displaced by urban renewal in Boston.
Id. While many of the slum dwellers in the study moved to better home environments, id. at
370-76, homeowners displaced by foreclosure are likely to see a decrease in the quality of
their housing. Homeowners who lose their homes also have psychological pressure
resulting from the financial difficulties associated with foreclosure. Therefore, the
psychological effects on homeowners who lose their homes to foreclosure are likely to be at
least as severe as those described in the study.
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are able to obtain rental housing or live with friends or relatives, the
loss of a home is devastating.
C. Predatory Lending
While there is a risk of loss with any home equity loan, that risk
is magnified for those homeowners who find themselves the victims
of predatory lenders. Finance companies and second mortgage
companies 63 target unsophisticated homeowners in low-income
neighborhoods for predatory loans characterized by exorbitant
interest rates, points, and closing costs.64  These homeowners may
pay interest rates in excess of 39 percent6 5 and points totaling as
much as $23,00066 or 33 percent of the amount financed.
67
Predatory loans may also have other unfair terms, such as high
prepayment fees that make refinancing prohibitively expensive,
balloon payments that may be due within a year or two after the loan
is closed,69  and mandatory refinancing of existing mortgages
63. Predatory lenders are usually finance companies or second mortgage companies,
and they often are assisted in their practices by mortgage brokers and home improvement
contractors. See SENATE COMM. ON BANKING, HOUSING, AND URBAN AFFAIRS, THE
COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT, CREDIT ENHANCEMENT, AND REGULATORY IMPROVEMENT Acr
OF 1993, S. REP. No. 169, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 21-22 (1993) [hereinafter SENATE REPORT];
Problems in Community Development Banking, Mortgage Lending Discrimination, Reverse
Redlining, and Home Equity Lending: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs, 103d Cong., Ist Sess. 315-16 (1993) [hereinafter Hearings on
Problems in Lending] (statement of Kathleen Keest, Nat'l Consumer Law Ctr.). In addition,
banks and savings and loans may also be involved by providing financing for predatory
lenders and by purchasing abusive loans from them. See infra note 268 and accompanying
text.
64. See Adding Injury to Injury: Credit on the Fringe: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Consumer Credit and Insurance of the House Comm on Banking, Finance
and Urban Affairs, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1993) [hereinafter Hearing on Credit]
(statement of Bruce Marks, Executive Director, Union Neighborhood Assistance Corp.).
65. Jack Meyers et al., Firm Wrote Loans at 39% Interest, BOSTON HERALD, June 17,
1991, at 1, 20.
66. Hearings on Problems in Lending, supra note 63, at 292 (statement of Eva
Davis).
67. Id. at 447 (letter from Elizabeth Renuart, Managing Att'y, St. Ambrose Legal
Servs., to Sen. Donald W. Riegle Jr. (Feb. 17, 1993)).
68. Hearing on Credit, supra note 64, at 3 (statement of Steven D. Caley, Atlanta
Legal Aid Soc'y).
69. Hearings on Problems in Lending, supra note 63, at 309 (statement of Scott
Harshbarger, Att'y General, Commonwealth of Mass.), 449 (letter from William E. Morris,
Director of Litig., S. Ariz. Legal Aid, to Sen. Donald W. Riegle Jr. (Feb. 18, 1993)).
388 TULANE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69
carrying lower interest rates.7° In a practice sometimes known as
"equity skimming," these lenders extract wealth in the form of home
equity from working class neighborhoods. 71  Because the interest
rates charged and certain other terms of these predatory loans would
not be legal in some states absent federal preemption, the
applicability of federal preemption of state consumer protection laws
to home equity loans is one of the causes of the predatory lending
problem.
72
The targets of predatory lenders are usually people who have
substantial equity in their homes due to rising real estate values or to
reduction of purchase money debt, but who are short on cash
because of their low or fixed incomes.73 They may need money to
make home repairs or improvements, to pay for necessities such as
medical care, or to consolidate household debts.74  These
homeowners generally do not obtain home equity loans primarily for
their tax advantages but because borrowing against their homes is
the only way that they can obtain the credit they need to make home
repairs or to survive periods of economic distress.75  Those most
70. Id. at 447 (letter from Elizabeth Renuart, Managing Att'y, St. Ambrose Legal
Servs., to Sen. Donald W. Riegle Jr. (Feb. 17, 1993)). The Dunckels' lender required that
the existing financing on their home, which had an 8% interest rate, be paid off with
proceeds of the new loan with its 19.9% interest rate.
71. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 63, at 22; Hearing on Credit, supra note 64, at 3
(statement of Bruce Marks, Executive Director, Union Neighborhood Assistance Corp.).
72. See Hearings on Problems in Lending, supra note 63, at 256-57 (statement of
Kathleen Keest, Nat'l Consumer Law Ctr.). Other causes of the predatory lending problem
include state deregulation of interest rates, appreciation in real estate values, and lack of
access to mainstream lending institutions. Id.; Hearing on Credit, supra note 64, at 1-2
(statement of Steven D. Caley, Atlanta Legal Aid Soc'y); see also infra notes 232-251 and
accompanying text.
73. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 63, at 22.
74. See id.; Hearings on Problems in Lending, supra note 63, at 449 (letter from
William E. Morris, Director of Litig., S. Ariz. Legal Aid, to Sen. Donald W. Riegle Jr. (Feb.
18, 1973)).
75. See Hearing on Credit, supra note 64, at 1 (statement of Richard . Syron,
President, Fed. Reserve Bank of Boston). Even the poor may be influenced by tax law to
consolidate indebtedness into home equity indebtedness and may thus lose their homes as a
consequence of seeking a tax deduction for interest payments. See Hearings on Problems in
Lending, supra note 63, at 251 (statement of Sen. Pete V. Domenici), 315 (statement of
Kathleen Keest, Nat'l Consumer Law Ctr.). When the interest rate on even a small loan is
very high, the total amount of interest paid in a year may exceed the standard deduction.
The interest paid by the Dunckels each year on their $31,000 loan was clearly in excess of
the standard deduction, and the deductibility of interest payments was one consideration in
their decision to consolidate their debts with a home equity loan. While deductibility of
interest payments is used as a sales pitch by home equity lenders, many homeowners are ill-
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often affected are minorities, the elderly, and the inner-city and rural
poor.76 The elderly are particularly vulnerable because they typically
have a great deal of equity in homes that they have owned for many
years and because they are likely to be on fixed incomes.77  Other
victims of predatory lending practices are the working poor, who
form the economic and social backbone of low-income
neighborhoods because they own homes that they have struggled to
78purchase and maintain.
Lenders, mortgage brokers, and home improvement contractors
may seek out particularly vulnerable homeowners on whom to prey.
They may check foreclosure notices to find financially troubled
homeowners or may cruise certain neighborhoods looking for homes
in need of repair.79 Upon finding a likely prospect, a lender, broker,
or contractor may use high pressure tactics or outright fraud to
induce the homeowner to enter into an abusive loan transaction.
8 0
equipped to determine whether the tax benefits outweigh the cost of a home equity loan. Id.
at 315 (statement of Kathleen Keest, Nat'l Consumer Law Ctr.).
76. See Hearings on Problems in Lending, supra note 63, at 254 (statement of Scott
Harshbarger, Att'y General, Commonwealth of Mass.), 257 (statement of Kathleen Keest,
Nat'l Consumer Law Ctr.). Middle class or suburban homeowners, like the Dunckels, may
be vulnerable when circumstances such as job loss or serious illness cause financial distress.
77. See HOBBS Er AL., supra note 16, at 9.
78. See Hearing on Credit, supra note 64, at 3 (statement of Bruce Marks, Executive
Director, Union Neighborhood Assistance Corp.).
79. See Mike Hudson, Stealing Home: How the Government and Big Banks Help
Second-Mortgage Companies Prey on the Poor, 26 CLEAmGHOUSE REv. 1476, 1479
(1993). Eva Davis, a San Francisco homeowner, believes that she was targeted because of a
yellow tag placed by the City of San Francisco on her house after it sustained damage in the
1989 earthquake. Hearings on Problems in Lending, supra note 63, at 291 (statement of
Eva Davis).
80. See Hearings on Problems in Lending, supra note 63, at 309 (statement of Scott
Harshbarger, Att'y General, Commonwealth of Mass.). Eva Davis was visited after the San
Francisco earthquake by two men, one claiming to be a contractor and the other claiming to
work for the Federal Emergency Agency (FEMA). Id. at 291 (statement of Eva Davis). Ms.
Davis testified:
The two men told me that I could qualify for a Government loan and see if
they could arrange a short time loan until I got the FEMA loan....
The contractor then called a person from the finance company in San Jose
over 50 miles away. Within an hour, a loan officer appeared at my home in San
Francisco. By the end of the day, I was talked into a loan that they said would pay
off my three existing loans and would permit me to make major repairs to my
home. I wasn't told how much the loan would be for or any other details of the
loan. In fact, since I suffer from glaucoma, I had recently broken my glasses. I
wasn't able to read the loan papers or sign any documents. The loan officer just
1994] 389
390 TULANE LAW REVEW [Vol. 69
For example, these parties may misrepresent loan terms, promise to
refinance on less onerous terms after the borrower has made
payments for some period, pressure a borrower to sign loan
documents without taking time to read them, physically obscure key
terms, have a borrower sign documents with key terms left blank, or
forge a borrower's signature. 81 Using these unscrupulous and often
illegal tactics, lenders may induce unsophisticated borrowers to enter
into loan transactions with payments larger than their incomes can
82support. When a borrower has difficulty making payments, the
lender may encourage refinancing of the debt with a larger loan
carrying a higher interest rate and requiring higher monthly payments
and payment of additional points and closing costs.
83
Predatory lenders have been accused of making loans designed
to fail so that the lenders can take title to borrowers' homes through
foreclosure. 84 These lenders often make loans without regard to the
borrower's ability to repay and with monthly payments that exceed
two-thirds of the borrower's monthly income.8 Predatory lenders
told me to sign my name on a blank sheet of paper and he would take care of
everything.
Within 2 weeks of meeting at my home, the loan contractor came to my
home and told me that I had qualified for a loan of $150,000. I called Congress
Mortgage and they told me that they had not paid off the first loan on my home as
they had said they would. I learned that my monthly payment would increase
from $619 to just under $2,000 a month. And I learned that Congress Mortgage
was charging me $23,000 in loan fees.
Within 5 months, my home was put into foreclosure by Congress Mortgage
because I was unable to make the loan payments of nearly $2,000 with my income
of under $1,100 a month. There was [sic] other problems as well.
Id. at 291-92.
81. See id. at 309 (statement of Scott Harshbarger, Att'y General, Commonwealth of
Mass.).
82. See Hearing on Credit, supra note 64, at 2 (statement of Richard F. Syron,
President, Fed. Reserve Bank of Boston).
83. See id.
84. See Hearings on Problems in Lending, supra note 63, at 254 (statement of Scott
Harshbarger, Att'y General of the Commonwealth of Mass.); 60 Minutes: A Matter of
Interest (CBS television broadcast, Nov. 15, 1992); see also HOBBS Er AL, supra note 16, at
38 ("Initially, it appeared that the equity skimmers were most interested in obtaining a quick
foreclosure sale of consumers' homes, which they could buy and then sell for a large
profit.").
85. See Hearing on Credit, supra note 64, at 5 (testimony of Bruce Marks,
Executive Director, Union Neighborhood Assistance Corp.). In fact, some cases have been
documented in which monthly payments on a home equity loan exceeded the borrower's
monthly income. See, e.g., Hearings on Problems in Lending, supra note 63, at 260
(statement of Terry Drent, Ann Arbor Community Dev. Dep't) (discussing monthly
HOME EQUITY FINANCING
rely on the borrower's equity in a home to secure the loan rather than
on the borrower's ability to repay, an underwriting practice clearly
inappropriate for home mortgage lending. 86 This practice sets up the
borrower for ultimate failure and loss of the home to foreclosure. In
fact, the lenders are in a "win-win" situation: "If the homeowner
pays the outrageous amounts, the lender reaps an enormous profit. If
the homeowner is unable to pay, the lender forecloses and gets the
house with equity typically in the tens of thousands of dollars."
87
Even if the borrower prepays the loan by refinancing at a more
reasonable interest rate, the lender profits from a prepayment penalty,
if there is one, and receives a higher rate of return on the loan
because of points paid at the closing.
88
Lenders justify the high interest rates on the loans because of
the high risk of making loans to less creditworthy borrowers.8 9
Whether the interest rates charged are commensurate with the risk
involved is questionable. In fact, the findings of several studies
indicate that high interest rates are not justified by the additional
payments of $250 required of a borrower with a monthly income of $220), 292 (statement of
Eva Davis, Resident, San Francisco) (discussing approximate monthly payments of $2,000
required of a borrower with a monthly income of under $1,100); Gary Chafetz & Peter S.
Canellos, Elderly Poor Losing Homes in Loan Scam: Unregulated Lenders Offer High
Rates, Risks-, BOSTON GLOBE, May 6, 1991, at 1, 6 (discussing monthly payments of $2,062
required of a borrower with a monthly income of about $800).
86. See Hearings on Problems in Lending, supra note 63, at 257 (statement of
Kathleen Keest, Nat'l Consumer Law Ctr.); HOBBS ET AL., supra note 16, at 12.
87. Hearing on Credit, supra note 64, at 2 (statement of Steven D. Caley, Atlanta
Legal Aid Soc'y).
88. See NELSON & WrmMAN, supra note 11, at 982-83; Whitman, supra note 8, at
1343.
89. Fleet Finance justifies higher rates based on "(1) higher delinquency rates and
charge-offs associated with consumer finance company home equity loans, (2) higher costs
of originating consumer finance company home equity loans, (3) higher costs of servicing
consumer finance company home equity loans, and (4) higher funding costs associated with
consumer finance companies." Hearings on Problems in Lending, supra note 63, at 334
(statement of John P. Hamill, President, Fleet Bank of Mass.). The risk factor is described in
this list as "higher delinquency rates and charge-offs." See id Higher origination and
servicing costs are a factor because most home equity loans are small loans, and it costs as
much to originate and service a small loan as a larger loan. Id. Consumer finance
companies have higher funding costs because they get their funds from banks or insurance
companies or otherwise have to pay market rates for their funds. Id. Banks and savings and
loans, on the other hand, obtain funds through government guaranteed deposits. Id.
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risk.90 Logic, too, suggests that the risk to a lender of a fully secured
loan is not so great as some of the high interest rates would imply.91
Regardless of the true risk involved, high interest rates and
corresponding high payments on predatory loans make default and
foreclosure more likely and, thus, perpetuate the myth of high risk.
92
While most homeowners can obtain home equity financing at a
market rate of interest, the problem of predatory lending remains
significant. Because homeowners who are victimized by predatory
lenders may ultimately lose their homes, predatory lending practices
targeted at low-income neighborhoods may result in "the social
fabric of many inner-city urban neighborhoods [being] tom apart and
communities destabilized., 93 Such a result should be of concern to
all.
D. The Fresh Start Policy of Bankruptcy
The fresh start policy of bankruptcy is one of the fundamental
policies embodied in bankruptcy law.94  A debtor who files
bankruptcy will receive a discharge from most debts in exchange for
surrendering nonexempt assets in a Chapter 7 liquidation or for
giving up a portion of his or her future income under a Chapter 13
plan.95  Bankruptcy law permits a consumer debtor to discharge
debts and yet to retain certain assets deemed necessary to the
90. See, e.g., Robert A. Eisenbeis & Neil B. Murphy, Interest Rate Ceilings and
Consumer Credit Rationing: A Multivariate Analysis of a Survey of Borrowers, 41 S. ECON.
J. 115, 122 (1974); Maurice B. Goudzwaard, Consumer Credit Charges and Credit
Availability, 35 S. ECON. J. 214, 217-20 (1969); A. Charlene Sullivan, Competition in the
Market for Consumer Loans, 36 J. ECON. & Bus. 141, 148 (1984).
91. See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text.
92. See Hearings on Problems in Lending, supra note 63, at 289 (statement of Sen.
Donald W. Riegle Jr., Chairman).
93. See id. at 254 (statement of Scott Harshbarger, Att'y General, Commonwealth of
Mass.).
94. See ThoM.As H. JACKSON, THm LoGIC AND LinrrS OF BANKRupTcY LAw 4 (1986);
SULLIVAN, WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 43, at 20. The other fundamental policy of
bankruptcy law is found in the protection of creditors from each other by providing a
mandatory forum for the fairest distribution of available assets to creditors. See JACKSON,
supra, at 4; SULLIVAN, WARREN & WEsTMROOK, supra note 43, at 20.
95. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 524, 726, 1322, 1328 (1988); JACKSON, supra note 94, at 225;
SuLLivAN, WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 43, at 25; Theodore Eisenberg, Bankruptcy
Law in Perspective, 28 UCLA L. REv. 953, 977 (1981); Karen Gross, Preserving A Fresh
Start for the Individual Debtor: The Case for Narrow Construction of the Consumer Credit
Amendments, 135 U. PA. L. RE. 59, 62-65 (1986).
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debtor's fresh start.96 Professors Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook's
work in the Consumer Bankruptcy Project legitimizes the consumer
bankruptcy process by confirming that the typical debtor is not a
"clever deadbeat" attempting to beat the system,97 but is in fact the
proverbial "honest but unfortunate debtor.
98
Among the assets deemed necessary to the fresh start is the
debtor's home.99 Thus, bankruptcy provides homeowners with a
safety net which represents the difference between a fresh start and
homelessness or dependency on the welfare system.1°° Current
bankruptcy law, however, gives special protection to home equity
lenders. This protection undermines the fresh start policy by limiting
the availability of discharge from a home equity loan and by making
retention in bankruptcy of a home securing a home equity loan more
difficult.' °1
III. FEDERAL ENCOURAGEMENT OF HOME OWNERSHIP
Although the federal government's promotion of home equity
financing is inconsistent with its policy favoring home ownership,10 2
each federal measure that encourages home equity financing grew
from a misguided or overbroad attempt to promote home
96. Justice Sutherland described the fresh start policy as follows:
This purpose of the act has been again and again emphasized by the courts as
being of public as well as private interest, in that it gives to the honest but
unfortunate debtor who surrenders for distribution the property which he owns at
the time of bankruptcy, a new opportunity in life and a clear field for future effort,
unhampered by the pressure and discouragement of preexisting debt.
Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234,244 (1934).
97. SUULIVAN, WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 43, at 328. Debtors in
bankruptcy are people who "are in very serious trouble and are least likely to repay their
creditors even without bankruptcy protection." Id. at 340.
98. This phrase apparently originated in Local Loan Co., 292 U.S. at 244. See
supra note 96 for the relevant quote.
99. See infra notes 163-164 and accompanying text.
100. See generally JACKSON, supra note 94, at 230-31 (justifying bankruptcy
discharge on the basis that it imposes much of the risk of bad credit decisions on creditors
rather than on social welfare programs). "'he two most important aspects of the fresh start.
.. are the provision of adequate property for a return to normal life, and the discharge, with
the release from creditor collection attempts." H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 125
(1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6086.
101. See infra part V.C.
102. See infra notes 191-192 and accompanying text.
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ownership. 10 3  Therefore, it is necessary to examine the federal
policy of encouraging home ownership in order to understand how
the measures promoting home equity financing conflict with federal
home ownership policy.
The federal government has long played a role in encouraging
home ownership in this country. The federal government has been
significantly involved in directing capital into the home mortgage
market to make financing available for home purchases 10 4 and has
encouraged Americans to purchase homes by giving preferential
income tax treatment to those who do. In addition, the federal
government has attempted to make home mortgage financing more
available and less expensive by preempting certain state laws
affecting home mortgage loans and by giving home mortgage lenders
special treatment in bankruptcy. 1
05
A. Federal Support of the Mortgage Market
Much of the legislation encouraging home ownership through
direction of capital into housing finance was passed in response to
the Great Depression and the collapse of the banking system. In the
1930s, savings and loan associations, then called building and loan
associations, were the primary vehicle for home mortgage financing,
103. See infra parts V.A.1, B.1-2, & C.1.
104. Because the purchase of a home is the largest investment the average American
will ever make and because homes are rarely built or purchased for cash, a primary factor in
the ability of an individual to own a home is the availability and cost of financing. See
Milton P. Semar et al., Evolution of Federal Legislative Policy in Housing: Housing
Credits, in 1 HOUSING IN THE SEVENTIES WORKING PAPERS 3, 3 (U.S. Dep't of Housing and
Urb. Dev. 1976).
105. These are not the only means by which the federal government promotes home
ownership. In 1990, Congress enacted the Cranston-Gonzalez National Affordable Housing
Act, Pub. L. No. 101-625, 104 Stat. 4079 (1990) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§
12,701-12,912 (Supp. 1111991)), which was designed to further the "national goal that every
American family be able to afford a decent home in a suitable environment." 42 U.S.C. §
12,701 (Supp. IM 1991). This legislation was intended to promote home ownership for low-
and moderate-income Americans by providing financial assistance and by encouraging
conversion of public housing units to private ownership. See 2 President George Bush,
Statement on Signing the Cranston-Gonzalez National Affordable Housing Act, 1990 PUn.
PAPERS 1699, 1699-1700 (Nov. 28, 1990); see also Bruce C. Ramsey et al., The Cranston-
Gonzalez National Affordable Housing Act-An Overview, 28 REAL PROP., PROB. & TR. J.
177, 180-88 (1993) (summarizing provisions of the Act). See generally Michael H. Schill,
Privatizing Federal Low Income Housing Assistance: The Case for Public Housing, 75




but the depression had a devastating effect on the savings and loan
industry.1 6 Most home mortgage loans made prior to the 1930s
were short-term loans that had to be refinanced or paid off in five
years or less. During the depression, lenders foreclosed' on massive
numbers of homes when homeowners were unable to pay off loans
and the lending institutions were unwilling to refinance.
10 7
In 1932, President Herbert Hoover made a plea to Congress for
the creation of a central credit system to facilitate new home
construction, to mitigate the difficulties of refinancing home
mortgages, and to encourage home ownership.10 8 In response to this
plea, Congress created the Federal Home Loan Bank System,
permitting members, primarily savings and loans, to borrow from the
federal home loan banks. 10 9 The next year, Congress authorized the
Federal Home Loan Bank Board to charter federal savings and loan
associations and required the federal savings and loans to invest their
deposits primarily in home mortgage lending by strictly limiting their
ability to make other types of investments. 110 Congress created the
Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation in 1934 to provide
federal deposit insurance for institutions belonging to the Federal
Home Loan Bank System1 and therefore made funds available for
home mortgage loans by encouraging deposits in savings
institutions.
The 1930s also brought support of the home mortgage market
in the form of federal mortgage insurance and federal support of the
secondary mortgage market.1' 2  Congress established the Federal
Housing Administration (FHA) in 1934 to provide federal insurance
106. See 78 CONG. Rnc. 11,182 (1934) (statement of Rep. Sirovich).
107. See id
108. President Herbert Hoover, Message from the White House (Dec. 24, 1931),
reprinted in 75 CONG. REC. 1263 (1932).
109. See Federal Home Loan Bank Act, Pub. L. No. 72-304, 47 Stat. 725 (1932)
(codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1421-1449 (1988)).
110. See Home Owners' Loan Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-43, 48 Stat. 128 (1933)
(codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1461-1468 (1988)).
111. See National Housing Act, Pub. L. No. 73-479,48 Stat. 1246 (1934) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. and 41 U.S.C.).
112. Mortgage lenders create mortgages in the primary market by originating loans
secured by real estate, and originators or other holders can sell mortgages in the secondary
market. ANHoNY DowNs, THE REVOLtrN iN REALESTATE FINANCE 24,235 (1985).
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against the risk of borrower default to home mortgage lenders. 113 In
1938, Congress authorized the creation of the Federal National
Mortgage Association (FNMA), at that time a government-owned
agency, to channel funds into the home mortgage market by
purchasing FHA-insured mortgage loans.114 In 1968, when FNMA
became a privately owned corporation under government
sponsorship, Congress created the Government National Mortgage
Association (GNMA), a government agency, to continue certain
programs previously run by FNMA. 115 In 1970, FNMA was given
authorization to purchase conventional, as well as federally-insured
loans, and Congress created the Federal Home Loan Mortgage
Corporation (FHLMC) to purchase conventional, FIHA, and Veterans
Administration loans on the secondary market.
16
Today, savings and loans continue to originate a substantial
number of residential mortgage loans, with banks and mortgage
companies being the other major originators of such loans.117 In
1993, savings institutions held approximately sixteen percent of the
total amount of outstanding residential mortgage debt."8 Federal or
federally sponsored agencies, including FNMA, FHLMC, and
GNMA, held or had securitized almost one-half of the total amount
of outstanding residential mortgage debt.119 Therefore, the federal
113. See National Housing Act, Pub. L. No. 73-479,48 Stat. 1246 (1934) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. and 41 U.S.C.). Congress gave authority to the
Veterans Administration (VA) to guarantee home mortgage loans for GI's in 1944. See
Servicemen's Readjustment Act, Pub. L. No. 78-346, 58 Stat. 284 (1944) (codified at 38
U.S.C. §§ 3701-3751 (1988)).
114. National Housing Act Amendments, Pub. L. No. 75424, § 211, 52 Stat. 8, 23
(1938) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1716 (1988)). FNMA was later authorized to
purchase loans guaranteed by the VA. See Act of July 1, 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-864, § 301,
62 Stat. 1206, 1206-07 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1717 (1988)).
115. See Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-448, § 801,
82 Stat. 476, 536 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1716(b) (1988)). More recently, GNMA has
operated a mortgage-backed securities (MBS) program. Under the MBS program, lenders
issue securities backed by packages of mortgages, and GNMA guarantees payment of
principal and interest on the mortgages. See NELSON & WHTMAN, supra note 40, § 11.3, at
793-94.
116. See Emergency Home Finance Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-351, §§ 301-310, 84
Stat. 450, 451 (codified'as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1459 (1988)). Both FNMA and
FHLMC are now heavily involved in the securitization of mortgages. See NESON &
WHITMAN, supra note 40, § 11.3, at 791.
117. See ECONOMIC REPOlzr OF THE PRESIDENT TRANSMrTTED TO THE CONGRESS
JANuARY 1993, H.R. Doc. No. 2, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 199 (1993).




government continues to promote home ownership through its
substantial involvement in the direction of capital into the residential
mortgage market.
B. Tax Law
Federal income tax law promotes home ownership in a number
of ways, the most notable being the allowance of a deduction for
home mortgage interest. 120  The Tax Reform Act of 1986121
eliminated many deductions, including the deduction for consumer
interest, but retained the home mortgage interest deduction 122 as
"one of the most sacred parts of the Tax Code.' 123 Current law
permits deduction of interest on home acquisition indebtedness up to
$1 million,124 with "acquisition indebtedness" being defined as
indebtedness secured by a residence that is incurred to acquire,
construct, or substantially improve the residence. 125 Other tax code
provisions promoting home ownership allow deduction of real
property taxes 126 and allow deduction of points on a home purchase
money loan in the year paid.127 Gain on the sale of a principal
residence is not recognized if a new residence is purchased within
two years.1 8 A taxpayer is also permitted a one-time exclusion from
income of up to $125,000 of gain from the sale of a principal
120. See Joseph A. Snoe, My Home, My Debt: Remodeling the Home Mortgage
Interest Deduction, 80 Ky. L.J. 431,452 (1991-92).
121. Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
I.R.C.).
122. Id. § 511, 100 Stat. at 2247 (repealed 1987). The Revenue Act of 1987, Pub. L.
No. 100-203, § 10,102, 101 Stat. 1330-382, 1330-384 to 1330-386 (codified at I.R.C. §
163(h) (1988)), redefined the interest that was deductible as "qualified residence interest."
123. 132 CONG. REc. 14,824 (1986) (statement of Sen. Pryor); see also id. at 13,591
(statement of Sen. Gramm) ('There is no basic principle in tax law that is more supported by
the American people than the principle that you ought to be able to deduct interest on your
home from your taxes.").
124. See I.R.C. § 163(h)(3)(B)(ii) (1988).
125. 1d § 163(h)(3)(B)(i). The term includes debt resulting from refinance of
acquisition indebtedness to the extent that the new debt does not exceed the outstanding
amount of the refinanced debt. Id The term "substantial improvemenf' is not defined in the
Code or in current regulations.
126. See id § 164(a).
127. See id. § 461(g)(2). Points generally may be deducted only over the life of the
loan. Ild § 461(g)(1).
128. See id. § 1034(a).
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residence once the taxpayer reaches the age of fifty-five. 129 Finally,
homeowners receive a tax benefit from home ownership because
homeowners are not taxed on the imputed income resulting from the
home's rental value. 130 The Internal Revenue Code thus promotes
home ownership directly by making it less expensive for an
individual to finance,13
1 to own, 132 and to sell a home.
133
C. Federal Preemption of State Law
Congress has attempted to provide for optimal functioning of
the home mortgage market by preempting certain state laws that
ostensibly interfered with it.134  As part of a general move to
deregulate the savings and loan industry,13 5 Congress enacted the
129. See id. § 121(a). In addition, sales of a principal residence are exempted from
original issue discount rules. See id. § 1274(c)(3)(B). However, I.R.C. § 483 may apply to
the seller of a principal residence. See 2 BoRis I. BrrrKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL
TAXATION OFINCOME, ESTAES & GiFrs 57.6.2, at 57-57 to 57-60 (2d ed. 1990) (discussing
transactions usually covered by § 483 instead of § 1274).
130. See 1 BrrTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 129, [ 5.3.1, at 5-22 n.1 ("Imputed
income is not exempted from tax by a specific statutory provision, but congressional silence
on the subject is clearly tantamount to an affirmative grant of immunity."). Since rent is not
deductible, renters must pay for housing with after-tax dollars.
131. See I.R.C. § 163(h)(3)(B)(i)(1) (1988) (permitting the deduction of interest paid
on indebtedness incurred in acquiring, constructing, or improving a first or second home);
id. § 461(g)(2) (permitting deduction of points on a mortgage loan incurred for purchase or
improvement of a principal residence in the year paid).
132. See id. § 164(a) (permitting deduction of real property taxes).
133. See id. § 1034(a) (providing for non-recognition of gain on the sale of a
principal residence if a new residence is purchased within two years); id. § 121 (providing a
one-time exclusion from income of up to $125,000 of gain from the sale of a principal
residence once a taxpayer reaches age 55).
134. See Frank S. Alexander, Federal Intervention in Real Estate Finance:
Preemption and Federal Common Law, 71 N.C. L. RE. 293, 315 (1993). Congress has
also preempted state law by enacting certain consumer protection measures, primarily in the
form of disclosure requirements. In 1968, Congress enacted the Truth-in-Lending Act, Pub.
L. No. 90-321, 82 Stat. 146 (1968) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1667e
(1988)), which requires that home mortgage lenders and other creditors disclose specified
information to borrowers, including the amount financed, the finance charge expressed as an
"annual percentage rate," and the total of all payments to be made under the loan. Id. §
1638(a). In 1974, Congress enacted the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, Pub. L. No.
93-533, 88 Stat. 1724 (1974) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2617 (1988)),
which requires home mortgage lenders to give the borrower a "good faith estimate" of
closing costs, id. § 2604(c), and prohibits kickbacks and referral fees for referral of business
related to settlement services in residential mortgage loans, id. § 2607.
135. During the 1960s, savings and loans, the primary source of home mortgage
financing at that time, began experiencing financial difficulties due to rising interest rates.
See THOMAS F. CARGILL & GnAjN G. GARciA, FINANCIAL DEREGULATON AND MONETARY
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Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of
1980 (DIDMCA),136 which preempts state usury ceilings on most
loans secured by a first lien on residential real estate.'37 In 1982,
Congress enacted the Alternative Mortgage Transaction Parity
Act,138 which overrides state laws that restrict alternative mortgage
financing arrangements, 139 as a part of the Gain-St. Germain
Depository Institutions Act.
140
DIDMCA preempts state law usury ceilings on any "federally
related mortgage loan" secured by a first lien on residential real
estate.14 1  Because DIDMCA defines "federally related mortgage
loan" broadly, the usury law preemption applies to virtually any first
lien home mortgage made by an institutional lender or the seller of
the home. 142  DIDMCA allowed states to opt out of the usury
CONTROL 12 (1982). Savings and loans deposits were short-term investments that
depositors could withdraw to find rates higher than those that savings and loans were
permitted to pay, but mortgage loans were usually long-term loans at fixed interest rates. Id.
at 12-13, 41. Interest rates continued to rise in the 1970s, leading to continued
disintermediation and eventually to deregulation in the early 1980s. Id. at 13, 40.
136. Pub. L. No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 132 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
12 U.S.C.).
137. See id tit. 5, § 501, 94 Stat. at 161 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1735f-
7a(a)(1) (1988)). In addition to preempting state usury ceilings, DIDMCA eliminated
interest rate ceilings on savings and loan deposits, see id. tit. 2, §§ 201-210, 94 Stat. at 142-
45 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 3501-3509 (1988)), and permitted savings and
loans to make a wide variety of investments other than home mortgage loans, see id. tit. 4,
§§ 401-402, 94 Stat. at 151-56 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1464 (1988)).
138. Pub. L. No. 97-320, 96 Stat. 1469 (1982) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C.
§ 3801-3806 (1988)).
139. See id. § 804 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 3803 (1988)).
140. Pub. L. No. 97-320, 96 Stat. 1469 (1982) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 12 U.S.C.). The Gan-St. Germain Act also includes a provision preempting
state laws regulating due-on-sale clauses. See id. tit. 3, § 341, 96 Stat. at 1505-07 (codified
at 12U.S.C. § 1701j-3 (1988)).
141. 12 U.S.C. § 1735f-7a(a)(1) (1988).
142. A federally related mortgage loan is any loan that is (1) made by a lender whose
deposits or accounts are federally insured, (2) made by a federally regulated lender, (3)
made, insured, guaranteed, or otherwise assisted by HUD or any other federal agency, (4)
eligible for purchase by FNMA, GNMA, or FHLMC, or from any financial institution from
which it could be purchased by FHLMC, or (5) made by any creditor subject to the Truth in
Lending Act who makes or invests in residential real estate loans totalling more than $1
million per year. Id. § 1735f-5(b)(2). For purposes of the usury law preemption, the term is
expanded to include loans made by any lender approved by HUD for participation in a
federal mortgage insurance program and loans made by an individual providing financing
for the sale of the individual's residence. See id. § 1735f-7a(a)(1)(C)(vi).
TULANE LAW REVIEW
preemption during a specified time period,'43 but only sixteen
jurisdictions did so. 44
The legislative history of DIDMCA gives some insight into
Congress' motive for preempting state usury law. Prior to the
enactment of DIDMCA, interest rates had risen to such an extent that
usury ceilings in some states prevented lenders from making
mortgage loans at market interest rates, and Congress became
concerned that mortgage funds would not be available in those
states. 145 According to a Senate Report accompanying the bill, this
interference with the availability of mortgage financing was harmful
to potential home buyers in those states and frustrated national
housing policies. 146  In addition, because DIDMCA eliminated
ceilings on interest rates paid on savings and loan deposits, the
preemption of state usury laws was necessary to the viability and
stability of the nation's financial system. 147 Therefore, the bases for
Congress' preemption of state usury laws were two-fold:
(i) to promote the stability and viability of financial institutions by
allowing them to charge and collect realistic market interest on
mortgage loans, and (ii) to promote the national housing policy and
the American dream of homeownership by legislatively opening a
spigot which would insure an increased and evenly-spread flow of
available mortgage money.
148
The Alternative Mortgage Transaction Parity Act (AMTPA)
preempts state laws that restrict alternative mortgage financing
arrangements such as variable interest rate loans, balloon payments,
and shared appreciation mortgages. 149 Congress enacted the statute
because "alternative mortgage transactions are essential to the
provision of an adequate supply of credit secured by residential
143. See id. § 1735f-7a(b)(2). A state was permitted to opt out by legislative action
or voter approval completed by April 1, 1983. See id.
144. See Alexander, supra note 134, at 315; William N. Eskridge Jr., One Hundred
Years of Ineptitude: The Need for Mortgage Rules Consonant with the Economic and
Psychological Dynamics of the Home Sale and Loan Transaction, 70 VA. L. REv. 1083,
1109 n.92 (1984).
145. S. REP. No. 368, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1980), reprinted in 1980
U.S.C.C.A.N. 236,254-55.
146. Id,
147. Id. at 255.
148. Smith v. Fidelity Consumer Discount Co., 898 F2d 907, 911 (3d Cir. 1990)
(quoting Bank of New York v. Hoyt, 617 R Supp. 1304, 1311 (D.R.I. 1985)).
149. See 12 U.S.C. § 3803 (1988 & Supp. 11989).
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property.'150 Various agencies already had adopted regulations that
permitted federally chartered financial institutions to provide
alternative mortgage financing.' 51 AMTPA extended the preemption
of state law in this area to other residential mortgage lenders. 152 As
with the federal preemption of state usury law under DIDMCA,




Federal bankruptcy law also has provisions included for the
purpose of fostering home ownership. Bankruptcy law protects
homeowners in bankruptcy by permitting them to retain some
amount of equity in a homestead as exempt property. The effect of
the homestead exemption in bankruptcy is to protect a homestead
against sale to satisfy the claims of unsecured creditors unless the
debtor's equity in the homestead exceeds the amount of the
exemption.1 55 A homestead is still subject in bankruptcy to valid
contractual liens against it. 156 The Bankruptcy Code gives a debtor
the option of choosing to exempt either the property that is listed in
the Bankruptcy Code as exempt or the property that is exempt under
applicable state law.15 7 However, states may opt out of the federal
exemptions, leaving debtors in these states only the right to state
exemptions.158 If a debtor has the option to choose the federal
exemption scheme and does so, the debtor's equity in a residence,
150. Id § 3801(a)(2) (1988).
151. See id. § 3801(a)(3) (Supp. 11989); 43 Fed. Reg. 59,336,59,336 (1978).
152. See 12 U.S.C. § 3802(2) (1988).
153. See id § 3804.
154. See, e.g., ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 9-A, § 1-110 (West Supp. 1993); N.Y.
BANiNG LAw § 6-g (McKinney 1990).
155. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(c) (1988); 2 DAVID G. EPSrEIN Er AL., BANKRutrcY § 8-1,
at 455, § 8-13, at 495 (1992).
156. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(c)(2) (1988); EPSTEIN Er AL, supra note 155, § 8-1, at 455.
157. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(b) (1988).
158. See id Thirty-six states have enacted legislation that prohibits debtors from
choosing the federal exemptions in bankruptcy. See 3 WmuuAM M. COTI ER, COLLIER ON
BANKRupTCy 522.02, at 522-11 n.4a (15th ed. 1993). Most of the states that have opted
out of the federal scheme exempt fewer assets than would be exempted under the federal
scheme. See SUIUVAN, WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 43, at 44 n.23.
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not to exceed $7,500 in value, is exempted. 159 If a debtor chooses to
exempt property under state law or the debtor's state has opted out of
the federal exemption scheme, then the amount of homestead
protection will vary considerably depending upon the state in which
the debtor resides. For example, Delaware, a state that has opted out
of the federal exemption scheme, 16 permits an individual debtor in
bankruptcy to exempt no more than $5000 worth of property, which
presumably could include equity in a home.' 6' A debtor in Texas, on
the other hand, may exempt a homestead encompassing as much as
an acre of land in the city or one hundred acres in the country,
regardless of the value of the property.
162
The reason for state exemption laws, including the homestead
exemption, is "to protect a debtor from his creditors, to provide him
with the basic necessities of life so that even if his creditors levy on
all of his nonexempt property, the debtor will not be left destitute and
a public charge. ' 163  State exemptions are carried forward in the
159. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(1) (1988). A married couple in bankruptcy can "stack"
their exemptions for a total homestead exemption of $15,000. See id. § 522(m).
160. See DEL CODEANN. tit. 10, § 4914(a) (Supp. 1992).
161. See id § 4914(b). Other states that have opted out of the federal exemption
scheme and that have homestead exemptions less generous than the federal exemption
include Alabama, Ohio, and Tennessee, each with a $5000 homestead exemption for an
individual debtor. See ALA. CODE § 6-10-2 (1993); OHIo REv. CODE ANN.
§ 2329.66(A)(1)(b) (Baldwin Supp. 1993); TENN. CODE ANN. § 26-2-301 (1980).
162. See TEx. PROP. CODE ANN. § 41.002 (West Supp. 1995). Florida also defines its
exemption in terms of area rather than value, permitting the exemption of a one-half acre
homestead in a municipality or 160 acres outside a municipality. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4.
Other states with generous homestead exemptions include California, with a homestead
exemption of $50,000 to $100,000, CAt. Civ. PRoc. CODE § 704.730(a) (West Supp. 1994),
North Dakota, with an $80,000 homestead exemption, N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-18-01 (Supp.
1993), and Wisconsin, with a $40,000 homestead exemption, Wis. STAT. ANN. § 815.20
(West Supp. 1993).
163. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 126 (1977), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6087; see also Public Health Trust v. Lopez, 531 So. 2d 946, 948 (Fla.
1988) ("As a matter of public policy, the purpose of the homestead exemption is to promote
the stability and welfare of the state by securing to the householder a home, so that
[homeowners] and [their] heirs may live beyond the reach of financial misfortune and the
demands of creditors."); Olsen v. Lohman, 13 N.W.2d 332, 339 (Iowa 1944) ("It was [the
legislators'] clear intent to secure to those benefited a place of residence where the
occupants might be sheltered and live in reasonable comfort safe from subjection to debts
which misfortune may thrust upon even those who have been industrious and prudent.");
Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. Parr, 370 P.2d 400, 404 (Kan. 1962) ("The primary concern of the
homestead exemption ... is to protect the family of the debtor... The foregoing purpose
... is entirely in keeping with the design of exemption laws to protect debtors against their
own improvidence."). See generally Joseph W. McKnight, Protection of the Family Home
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Bankruptcy Code. In addition, the Bankruptcy Code provides a
federal exemption option because of the federal interest in permitting
a debtor to keep sufficient possessions for a fresh start.164  Since
equity in a homestead may be exempted under both state and federal
exemption schemes, the home apparently is considered one of the
possessions necessary to the fresh start.
Another provision of the Bankruptcy Code that was enacted to
promote home ownership gives special protection to home mortgage
lenders. Under Section 1322(b)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code, a
Chapter 13 plan may "modify the rights of holders of secured claims,
other than a claim secured only by a security interest in real property
that is the debtor's principal residence." 165  Although unsecured
claims and most secured claims may be modified under a Chapter 13
plan, creditors are entitled to receive at least as much as they would
from Seizure by Creditors: The Sources and Evolution of a Legal Principle, 86 Sw. HisT. Q.
369 (1983) (discussing the origins and development of homestead exemption laws).
164. H.R. REP. No. 595, supra note 163, at 126, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
6087. Professor Eisenberg makes the following comment on the federal exemption scheme
provided for in the Bankruptcy Code:
Presumably, [the exemption] provision reflects Congress's judgment as to the
minimal amount debtors should be permitted to maintain. Yet federal law's
overall approach to exemptions contains some disquieting features. If some
minimal core of assets is necessary to decent survival in bankruptcy, should not
that core also be available in the absence of a bankruptcy proceeding?... The
real problem with state exemptions was not lack of uniformity but plain
inadequacy. If state exemption laws are sufficiently archaic to justify federal
interference in bankruptcy, it strains credibility to consider them inviolable outside
of bankruptcy.
Eisenberg, supra note 95, at 972-73 (footnotes omitted). The same argument can be made
with regard to the Bankruptcy Code provision that permits states to opt out of the federal
exemption scheme. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(b) (1988).
165. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) (1988). Congress recently amended the Bankruptcy
Code to add a similar provision in Chapter 11. See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L.
No. 103-394, § 206, 108 Stat. 4106,4123 (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. § 1123(b)(5)). Prior
to this amendment, homeowners could avoid the antimodification provision of § 1322(b)(2)
by filing bankruptcy under Chapter 11 rather than under Chapter 13.
The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994 also added § 1322(c)(2), which provides:
[I]n a case in which the last payment on the original payment schedule for a
claim secured only by a security interest in real property that is the debtor's
principal residence is due before the date on which the final payment under the
plan is due, the plan may provide for the payment of the claim as modified
pursuant to section 1325(a)(5) of this title.
Pub. L. No. 103-394, § 301, 108 Stat. 4106, 4131. This section is discussed infra at notes
286-288,413-417 and accompanying text.
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have received in a Chapter 7 liquidation. 166 Therefore, a Chapter 13
plan might provide for modification of a secured debt to reduce the
amount of the monthly payment by reducing the interest rate to a
market rate, by extending the maturity date of the debt, or by
reducing the amount of principal to an amount equal to the value of
the collateral.167 A Chapter 13 plan may not, however, change the
payment schedule or interest rate of a loan secured by the debtor's
principal residence and must therefore provide for continuation of
the contracted-for payments on a home mortgage loan if the debtor is
to retain possession of the home under the plan.161 In addition, the
United States Supreme Court recently resolved a conflict among the
circuits by holding that Section 1322(b)(2) prohibits lien stripping of
an undersecured home mortgage loan in Chapter 13.169 "Lien
stripping" refers to the practice of reducing the amount that a debtor
must pay in order to retain possession of property securing a loan to
an amount equal to the value of the property.170 Since lien stripping
of a home mortgage loan is prohibited, a homeowner in Chapter 13
must pay the entire amount of a home mortgage debt in order to
remain in possession of the home even if the debt exceeds the value
of the home.
At first glance, Section 1322(b)(2) would not appear to promote
home ownership since some Chapter 13 debtors, unable to continue
166. See 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(4), (5) (1988).
167. Reduction of the principal to the value of the collateral is called "lien stripping."
See infra notes 169-170 and accompanying text.
168. A Chapter 13 debtor may cure a default in a home mortgage loan even after
acceleration and reinstate the original payment schedule. See Grubbs v. Houston First An.
Say. Ass'n, 730 F2d 236,238 (5th Cir. 1984); In re Taddeo, 685 E2d 24,26 (2d Cir. 1982);
see also Bankruptcy Amendments of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, § 301, 108 Stat. 4131 (to
be codified at 11 U.S.C. § 1322(c)(1)). Cure of a default, even over the term of the Chapter
13 plan, is not considered a modification of the loan. Grubbs, 730 F.2d at 241; Taddeo, 685
E2d at 26.
169. Nobelman v. American Say. Bank, 113 S. Ct. 2106,2111 (1993).
170. See Jane K. Winn, Lien Stripping After Nobelman, 27 Loy. L.A. L. RE. 541,
542-43 (1994). Lien stripping was accomplished in Chapter 13 by bifurcating an
undersecured loan into secured and undersecured portions, with the secured portion being
paid under the terms of the Chapter 13 plan and the unsecured portion being discharged.
See Nobenan, 113 S. Ct. at 2108-09. Because § 1322(b)(2) prohibits modification of a
"claim secured only by a security interest in real property that is the debtor's principal
residence," the interest rate and payments on a home mortgage loan had to remain the same.
11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) (1988). The result was a Chapter 13 plan that provided for
preservation of regular monthly payments on the loan but for a shorter loan term, a result the
Supreme Court found untenable. Nobelnan, 113 S. Ct. at 2111.
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making the contracted-for payments on their home mortgage loans,
would lose their homes. The argument, however, was made by the
home mortgage industry that permitting modification of home
mortgage loans in Chapter 13 would have a negative impact on the
availability of home mortgage credit.171 Congress apparently agreed
because the enacted version of the statute prohibited modification of
loans secured only by a debtor's principal residence.172 Therefore,
the Bankruptcy Code gives less protection to the interest of debtors
in retaining their homes than it gives with respect to other assets
because "favorable treatment of residential mortgagees was intended
to encourage the flow of capital into the home lending market."'
173
The provisions of the Bankruptcy Code provide an illustration
of the tension between promotion of home ownership by giving
protection to individual homeowners and promotion of home
ownership by giving protection to home mortgage lenders.
Consumer protection measures attempt to promote home ownership
by helping the individual homeowner, in some cases at the expense
of a mortgage lender, while lender protection measures attempt to
promote home ownership by making mortgage credit more available
and less costly at the expense of individual homeowners. 17 4  The
171. See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978: Hearings on S. 2266 and H.R. 8200
Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 707,714 (1977) (statement of Edward J. Kulik, Senior Vice
President, Real Est. Div., Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co.); id. at 715 (statement of Robert E.
O'Malley, att'y, Covington & Burling).
172. See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 101, 92 Stat. 2549,
2648 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) (1988)).
173. Nobelman, 113 S. Ct. at 2111-12 (Stevens, J., concurring) (citing Grubbs v.
Houston First Am. Say. Ass'n, 730 F.2d 236,245-46 (5th Cir. 1984)).
174. Mortgage lenders argue that consumer protection statutes protect a few
homeowners at the expense of the majority because the costs that consumer protection
impose on lenders are passed along to their borrowers in the form of higher interest rates. In
arguments before the Supreme Court on the issue of lien stripping of home mortgages in
Chapter 13, lenders asserted that lien stripping would disrupt mortgage markets and restrict
access to mortgage credit for riskier applicants. Brief for Amicus Curiae Federal Home
Loan Mortgage Corporation in Support of Respondent at 25-26, Nobelman v. American
Say. Bank, 113 S. Ct. 2106 (1993) (No. 92-641). However, there is no empirical evidence
available to indicate that home mortgage interest rates would be higher if homeowners were
permitted to modify their home mortgage loans in Chapter 13. See Winn, supra note 170, at
587 n.248.
Lenders make similar arguments about the effects of state anti-deficiency and
redemption statutes. See Schill, supra note 46, at 489. The empirical evidence gathered
with regard to the effect on home mortgage interest rates of state law protection of home
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homestead exemption is an example of a measure that promotes
home ownership by protecting the homeowner because a homeowner
in bankruptcy is entitled to retain his or her home, to the extent it is
exempt, even if general creditors go unpaid.175 Section 1322(b)(2) is
an example of a measure that promotes home ownership by giving
special protection to the home mortgage lender because a home
mortgage lender must be paid in full under the original terms of the
loan in order for a homeowner to retain possession of his or her
home.' 76  Both types of measures were adopted ostensibly to
promote home ownership.
E. Promotion of Home Ownership as a Worthwhile Goal
One may question the propriety of the federal government's
involvement in promoting home ownership. While there are both
proponents and critics of current federal policy, most Americans
want to own their own homes. 177 Advantages of home ownership to
the individual include increased stability and security for the
homeowner, better home and neighborhood environment, increased
social and financial status, and investment opportunity in an asset
that may appreciate. 178 Many of the benefits of home ownership are
mortgage borrowers-primarily anti-deficiency and redemption statutes-is inconclusive.
See id. at 496-97, 514. Professor Schill argues that even to the extent these types of statutes
make interest rates slightly higher, they provide a system of compulsory insurance to protect
borrowers against the risk of default and foreclosure. Id. at 515.
175. See supra notes 155-164 and accompanying text.
176. See supra notes 165-173 and accompanying text.
177. Since 1992, FNMA has sponsored an annual survey of American's attitudes
regarding home ownership. See FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE ASSOCIATION, FANNim MAE
NATIONAL HousING Sunvny 1 (1994). In 1994, 86% of Americans believed that
homeowners are "better off' than renters. IaL at 10; see also James W. Hughes & Todd
Zimmerman, The Dream is Alive, AM. D)EmOGRAPHICS, Aug. 1993, at 32, 34-35 ("Eighty
percent of respondents [to the 1992 survey] identify the traditional single-family detached
home with a yard as the ideal place to live."); Homeowning a High Priority in Survey, 52
FAcTs ON FLE 453,453 (1992) ("A majority of Americans believed that owning a home was
an important goal that was worth making sacrifices to achieve."). The results of the FNMA
surveys are consistent with earlier studies showing the strong desire of Americans to own
their own homes. See Frank S. Sengstock & Mary C. Sengstock, Homeownership: A Goal
for All Americans, 46 J UPR. L. 313, 318, 322 (1969). In 1991, 64% of householders
owned their own homes. See BuRE u OF THE CENsus, HogmowNERsHw: 1989 To 1991
(June 1992).
178. See JOHN P. DEAN, HOME OwNEasHP : Is rr SouND? 10-15 (2d ed. 1945);
SuLuVAN, WARREN & WEsTEROOK, supra note 43, at 128-29; Isaac F. Megbolugbe & Peter
D. Linneman, Home Ownership, 30 URB. STUD. 659, 660-61 (1993); Sengstock &
Sengstock, supra note 177, at 326-41; Richard E. Slitor, Rationale of the Present Tax
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psychological benefits. 7 9 Disadvantages to the individual of home
ownership include impaired mobility' 80 and the risk of loss of the
investment if the home must be sold at a time when real estate values
have declined' 81 or if the home is lost to foreclosure.
182
In assessing the federal government's role in promoting home
ownership, society's interest in home ownership may be more
important than the individual's interest. There are societal benefits
and costs of the federal government's policy of promoting home
ownership. Proponents of measures favoring home ownership cite
benefits to society as including better preservation of housing stock
due to superior maintenance of owner-occupied dwellings,
183
increased savings and wealth accumulation of homeowners, 84 and
the propensity of homeowners to be more responsible and involved
citizens due to their greater stake in the community. 185 The costs to
Benefits for Homeowners, in 2 HOUSING IN THE SEVENTIES WORKING PAPERS 907, 908-09
(U.S. Dep't of Housing and Urb. Dev. 1976), reprinted in FEDERAL HOUSING POIC'Y &
PROGRAMS 163, 165-67 (J. Paul Mitchell ed., 1985); see also Why It Still Pays to Buy a
House, FORTUNE, May 3, 1993, at 22 (explaining the economic advantages of owning a
home even if appreciation lags behind inflation).
179. See Megbolugbe & Linneman, supra note 178, at 660.
180. See DEAN, supra note 178, at 79-81; Megbolugbe & Linneman, supra note 178,
at 670-71; Schill, supra note 105, at 919; Sengstock & Sengstock, supra note 171, at 344.
But see Slitor, supra note 178, reprinted in FEDERAL HOUSING POLICY & PROGRAMS at 167-
68 (arguing that home ownership does not significantly impair mobility because of the ease
with which a home may be sold and because of tax law providing for non-recognition of
gain upon sale of a residence if proceeds are invested in a new residence).
181. The rapid appreciation in real estate values that occurred over the past 25 years
appears to have slowed or stopped altogether with many markets showing a reduction in
home values in more recent years. See Sean A. Bum, Outlook for the Economy and Real
Estate, 2 REAL EST. OUrLooK 2, 4 (1989); Thomas J. Lueck, New York Region's Housing:
No Signs of Return to Boom, N.Y TmS, Sept. 24, 1989, § 1, at 1; Robert A. Rosenblatt,
Real Estate Woes Spread to California Banks, Cm. TR]B., Dec. 11, 1991, § 3, at 1; Falling
Home Prices May Hurt Banks, Gonzalez Warns, L.A. TIams, Dec. 15, 1989, at D2. Some
economists have even predicted that homes will depreciate significantly through the 1990s
and beyond. See N. Gregory Mankiw & David N. Weil, The Baby Boom, the Baby Bust,
and the Housing Market, 19 REG. Sci & URB. ECON. 235,236 (1989).
182. See supra notes 35, 58-60 and accompanying text.
183. See RAYMOND J. STRUYK, THE URB. INST., SHOULD GOVERNMENT ENCOURAGE
HoMEOwNnsm'? 15 (1977); Megbolugbe & Linneman, supra note 178, at 660; Slitor,
supra note 178, reprinted in FEDERAL HOUSING POLICY & PROGRAMS at 166.
184. See STRUYK, supra note 183, at 23; Megbolugbe & Linneman, supra note 178,
at 660; Slitor, supra note 178, reprinted in FEDERAL HOUSING POL1CY & PROGRAMS at 167.
185. See STRUYK, supra note 183, at 25-26; Megbolugbe & Linneman, supra note
178, at 661; Slitor, supra note 178, reprinted in FEDERAL HOUSING POLICY & PROGRAMS at
165. Empirical studies indicate that homeowners are more likely than renters to vote, see
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society include the costs of governmental measures that promote
home ownership, the costliest being the tax provisions favoring
home ownership.18 6  Societal costs may also include increased
infrastructure costs for roads and utilities and increased energy costs,
all of which result from the low density of single-family homes, the
preferred owner-occupied dwelling.187  The benefits and costs to
society should be weighed to determine if the government's policies
should be continued in their present form.
In addition to critics of the home ownership policy itself, there
are critics of the means used by the federal government to promote
home ownership. The allowance of a deduction for home mortgage
interest has been criticized as being a subsidy directed at middle-
class and wealthy taxpayers and as being of little benefit to
moderate- and low-income homeowners.18 8  Despite this criticism,
the home mortgage interest deduction is unlikely to be eliminated
due to its popularity and the perceived political risk of opposing it.
189
The special treatment given home mortgage lenders in bankruptcy,
which was designed to increase availability of home mortgage credit,
NATIONALASS'N OFREALTORS, HOMEowNmRsinP: KEY TO THE AMERICAN DREAM 22 (1988);
PHaIP K. PIEIE & JOHN STuAir HALL, BUDGETS, BONDS, AND BALLOTS: VOTING BEHAVIOR
IN SCHOOL FINANCIAL ELECTIONS 44 n.31 (1973); Paul W. Kingston et al., The Politics of
Homeownership, 12 AM. Poi- Q. 131, 146 (1984), to interact with neighbors, see Terry C.
Blum & Paul W. Kingston, Homeownership and Social Attachment, 27 Soc. PERS. 159,
173 (1984), and to participate in community politics, Kevin R. Cox, Housing Tenure and
Neighborhood Activism, 18 URB. AFFAIRs Q. 107, 122 (1982).
186. See STRUYK, supra note 183, at 7; William G. Grigsby, Housing Finance and
Subsidies in the United States, 27 URB. STUD. 831, 844 (1990); Megbolugbe & Linneman,
supra note 178, at 673. Tax subsidies to home ownership exceed the cost of all direct
federal housing subsidies and local rental assistance programs combined. Grigsby, supra, at
844.
187. See STRum, supra note 183, at 36-37. These costs may be more attributable to
a preference for single-family dwellings than to a preference for owner-occupied housing.
Id.
188. See 132 CONG. REc. 26,690 (1986) (statement of Sen. Dole); STRuYK, supra
note 183, at 29-31; Cushing Dolbeare, How the Income Tax System Subsidizes Housing for
the Affluent, in CRmCAL PERsPECnvEs ON HOUSiNG 264, 268-69 (Rachel G. Bratt et al. eds.,
1986); James M. Poterba, Taxation and Housing: Old Questions, New Answers, 82 AM.
ECON. REv. 237, 239-40 (1992). Low-income homeowners typically do not have deductions
in excess of the standard deduction and therefore would not choose to itemize. Dolbeare,
supra, at 269; Poterba, supra, at 239. But see supra note 75.
189. See supra note 123 and accompanying text. There has been a recent focus on
providing home ownership opportunities for the poor. See supra note 105.
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has been criticized on the basis that it strikes an improper balance
between the interests of lenders and individual homeowners.'
90
The tension between measures that promote home ownership
by giving protection to individual homeowners and measures that
promote home ownership by giving protection to home mortgage
lenders' 9 l illustrates the complex nature of the federal government's
present formula for promoting home ownership. When measures
promoting home equity financing are added to this formula, it moves
from complexity to incoherence. By encouraging homeowners to
place liens on their homes to secure consumer borrowing and by
encouraging lenders to require home mortgage liens, the federal
government is increasing the incidence of homes lost to foreclosure,
thus undermining its policy favoring home ownership. However,
because of the harmful effects of foreclosure of a home,19 2 one does
not have to be a proponent of the federal home ownership policy to
believe that federal measures that increase the likelihood of losing a
home to foreclosure are insupportable.
IV FEDERAL PROMOnON OF HOME EQurrY FINANCING AND ITs
EFFECTS
Although federal promotion of home equity financing
undermines the federal home ownership policy and is otherwise
inappropriate, existing federal law encourages both homeowners and
lenders to choose the home equity loan as the preferred vehicle for
the extension of consumer credit. First, tax law gives preferential
treatment to home equity borrowers by allowing deduction of
interest on a home equity loan while disallowing deduction of other
consumer interest. Second, federal preemption of state usury
ceilings and other consumer protection laws affect certain home
equity loans as well as home purchase money loans. Finally,
bankruptcy law gives preferential treatment to home equity lenders
as well as to home purchase money lenders.
193
190. See Winn, supra note 170, at 583,616-17.
191. See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
192. See supra notes 58-62 and accompanying text.
193. These are not the only means by which the federal government promotes home
equity financing. The Gam-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, Pub. L. No.
97-320, 96 Stat. 1469 (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.), gave national banks and
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A. Tax Law
1. Description and Legislative History
Federal income tax law provides the most blatant example of
federal promotion of home equity financing. Under current law, a
taxpayer may deduct interest paid on home equity indebtedness in an
amount not exceeding the lesser of $100,000 or the taxpayer's equity
in the home. 194  Therefore, within the prescribed limits, a
homeowner with equity in a home can deduct interest paid on a
consumer loan secured by a lien on the home. Renters and
homeowners without equity cannot similarly deduct consumer
interest.
The Tax Reform Act of 1986195 was a major overhaul of
income tax law with many deductions being eliminated. This Act
created the forerumnner of the current scheme for deductibility of
home mortgage interest. Under the Internal Revenue Code of 1954,
most interest paid by individuals, including home mortgage interest,
was deductible. 196 In January 1984, President Ronald Reagan, in his
federally chartered savings associations expanded authority to make home equity loans. See
supra note 29. In addition, the federal government has provided support for a secondary
market in home equity loans. Both FNMA and FHLMC are authorized to purchase second
lien loans, see 12 U.S.C. §§ 1454(a)(4), 1717(b)(5) (1988), and both agencies do so to a
minor extent, see F-D. NAT'L MORTGAGE Ass'N, 1992 ANNUAL REPOR" 33 (1993) (reporting
that holdings of second mortgages account for less than 1% of FNMA's single-family
mortgage portfolio); R-m. HOME LOAN MORTGAGE CORP., 1992 AN~uAL REPORT 55 (1993)
(reporting that the number of second mortgages and home improvement loans is less than
one-half of one percent of the total number of single-family mortgages held or securitized by
FHLMC). Finally, Congress has authorized the Secretary of Housing and Urban
Development to implement a demonstration program of mortgage insurance for home equity
conversion loans for elderly homeowners. See 12 U.S.C. § 1715z-20 (1988). I do not
further discuss these federal measures promoting home equity financing in this Article
because (1) deregulation of financial institutions to permit them to make home equity loans
is consistent with my conclusion that the federal government should permit home equity
lending while not encouraging it, (2) FNMA's and FHLMC's involvement with home equity
lending is minimal, and (3) home equity conversion loans for elderly homeowners involve
special policy considerations that are beyond the scope of this Article. See supra note 16.
194. See I.R.C. § 163(h)(3)(A)(ii), (h)(3)(C) (1988). The taxpayer's equity in the
home is its fair market value less the amount of acquisition indebtedness. See id. at §
163(h)(3)(C). In order to qualify, the indebtedness must be secured by a lien on the home.
See id
195. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of I.R.C.).
196. See Pub. L. No. 83-591, ch. 736, § 163, 68A Stat. 46, 46 (repealed 1986). The
1954 Code provided for a few exceptions to the general deductibility of interest. See id. §§
264-267, 68A Stat. at 77-79.
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annual State of the Union address, asked for tax reform that would
bring "fairness, simplicity and incentives for growth." 19 7 Treasury
Department officials, who worked on tax reform in 1984 at President
Reagan's request, considered eliminating the home mortgage interest
deduction as a middle-class tax shelter and a siphon of money into
the housing industry.198  However, in May of that year, President
Reagan made a speech to the National Association of Realtors and
promised to preserve the home mortgage interest deduction. 199 The
Treasury Department's proposal, called Treasury I, preserved the
home mortgage interest deduction, but limited the deductibility of
consumer interest.
200
Early versions of the tax reform bill in Congress phased out
deductibility of consumer interest but provided for deduction of
interest on any loan secured by a first or second residence.
20 1
Lenders recognized this as a "loophole" and, even before the tax
reform package was passed, began advertising home equity loans as
a means for homeowners to continue deducting interest paid on
consumer loans despite the general nondeductibility of consumer
interest under the proposed measure.20 2  A group of senators
proposed an amendment to the Senate bill that would limit the
deductibility of home mortgage interest to interest on loans used for
acquisition, construction, or improvement of a home or for education
or medical expenses.20 3 They argued that the amendment would
197. 1 President Ronald Reagan, Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on
the State of the Union, 1984 PuB. PAPERS 87, 90 (Jan. 25, 1984).
198. See JEFFREY H. BIRNBAUM & ALAN S. MURRAY, SHOWDOWN AT Gucci GULCH 57
(1987).
199. See 1 President Ronald Reagan, Remarks at the Midyear Meeting of the
National Association of Realtors, 1984 PUB. PAPERS 675, 678 (May 10, 1984).
200. 1 DEP'T OF TREASURY, TAX REFORM FOR FAiRNESS, SIMPUCITY, AND ECONOMIC
GROWTH 83 (1984).
201. See H.R. 3838, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985); SENATE COMM. ON FNANCE, TAX
REFORM Acr OF 1986, S. RE. No. 313, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 802-08 (1986); HousE COMM.
ON WAYS AND MEANS, TAX REFORM AcT OF 1985, H.R. REP. No. 426, 99th Cong., 1st Sess.
296-301 (1985).
202. See 132 CONG. R.:. 13,595 (1986) (statement of Sen. Gramm); id. at 13,601
(statement of Sen. Gorton).
203. See id. at 13,590. Another provision of the tax reform bill made property taxes
and income taxes deductible, but denied deductibility of sales taxes. See iL (statement of
Sen. Evans). Senators from sales tax states proposed an amendment that would give
taxpayers the option of deducting either income taxes or sales taxes, and in order to make
the amendment revenue neutral under the Senate guidelines prohibiting amendments that
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eliminate the injustice of a provision that would permit homeowners
with equity in their homes to deduct interest on consumer debt, such
as debt used to purchase a car or fur coat or to finance a vacation, but
would prohibit those who rented their housing from deducting such
interest.2°4  Other senators, however, rose to support the unlimited
deductibility of interest on loans secured by a first or second
residence on the basis that a home was in most cases a taxpayer's
most valuable asset and primary means of saving.2 °5 These senators
argued that taxpayers should be able to borrow against home equity
and use loan proceeds for purposes other than payment of education
or medical expenses-purposes such as helping their elderly parents,
helping their children make a down payment on a home, saving a
family business, or dealing with other family emergencies.
20 6
Senator Phil Gramm of Texas, a state with a constitutional provision
prohibiting home equity loans,20 7 felt compelled to explain several
times that the provision did nothing to limit the ability of a
homeowner to borrow against a home for any purpose but merely
denied deduction of interest on those loans that were not for the
stated purposes of acquisition, construction, or improvement of a
home or payment of education or medical expenses. 20 Although the
amendment failed, the version of the bill that eventually was passed
by both the House and Senate limited the deductibility of home
mortgage interest along lines similar to the proposed amendment.20 9
would raise the deficit, the senators proposed the limitation on deductibility of home
mortgage interest. See id at 13,590-91 (statement of Sen. Evans).
204. See id. at 13,590-601 (statements of Sen. Evans and Sen. Gramm), 13,602
(statement of Sen. Bumpers).
205. See id. at 13,593 (statement of Sen. Boren), 13,599 (statement of Sen. Ford).
206. See idL at 13,593-94 (statement of Sen. Boren), 13,597-98 (statement of Sen.
Durenberger), 13,600 (statement of Sen. Chaffee). Senator Chaffee of Rhode Island even
suggested that homeowners should be able to mortgage their homes to buy a sailboat, if they
so desired, and deduct the interest on the loan. See id at 13,601. In addition, Senator Boren
was concerned about enforcement of a provision limiting deductibility of interest on the
basis of the use of the loan proceeds. See id at 13,594.
207. Tx. CONST. art. XVI, § 50. Texas is also a sales tax state, which explains
Senator Gramm's other motivation for supporting the amendment.
208. See 132 CoNG. REc. 13,594, 13,597 (1986).
209. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 511(b), 100 Stat. 2085,2247-49
(codified as amended at I.R.C. § 163(h)(3) (1988)). Under the Tax Reform Act of 1986, a
deduction was allowed for interest secured by a qualified residence, which was defined to
include the taxpayer's principal residence and one other residence. See id. However, the
deduction was limited to interest on indebtedness up to the amount of the taxpayer's basis in
the residence, plus interest on indebtedness used for qualified medical or educational
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Just one year after the enactment of the Tax Reform Act of
1986, Congress amended the tax code to provide the current scheme
for deduction of home equity interest.210 The House Budget
Committee discussed reasons for the change as follows:
[Tihe committee is concerned that significant amounts of
borrowing for general personal purposes, in excess of amounts that
could be related to encouraging home ownership, is permitted under
the provisions of present law....
The purpose of encouraging home ownership without creating
disincentives to saving might be achieved most directly by allowing a
deduction only for interest on debt secured by the taxpayer's
residence that is for the purpose of acquiring (or substantially
improving) the residence....
Nevertheless, the committee recognizes that there may be
situations when the deduction of additional amounts of home
mortgage interest might be motivated by other policy concerns. The
committee also believes that the provisions of present law are
needlessly complex, and that the same purpose could be achieved
with much simpler provisions. The special rules for educational and
medical expenditures, in particular, create unnecessary
administrative difficulty in ascertaining the amount of interest that is
deductible, when a comparable result can be obtained with a simpler
dollar cap.211
Congress therefore eliminated the limitation on use of home equity
loan proceeds and instead imposed a cap on the amount of home
equity indebtedness with respect to which interest could be
deducted.212
expenses, with an overall limitation that the indebtedness not exceed the fair market value of
the residence. See id. This essentially permitted a taxpayer to deduct interest on a home
equity loan to the extent that the equity in the home resulted from the taxpayer's down
payment, repayment of purchase money indebtedness, or improvements, and to deduct
interest on a loan secured by equity resulting from appreciation of the home to the extent
that the proceeds of the loan were used for medical or educational expenses. By permitting
a taxpayer to deduct interest on a loan secured by home equity up to the taxpayer's basis in
the home, the provision encouraged substantial borrowing against the home with no
limitation on use of loan proceeds.
210. Revenue Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-203, tit. X, § 10,102, 101 Stat. 1330-384
to 1330-387 (codified at I.R.C. § 163(h)(3) (1988)).
211. H.R. REP. No. 391, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 1031-32(1987).
212. See ida at 1031, 1033.
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While tax reform decreased individual taxpayer's overall
213incentive to borrow by lowering tax rates, increasing the standard
deduction, 2 14 and disallowing deduction of consumer interest,2 15 it
made home equity loans more attractive to taxpayers than other types
of consumer credit. Although the current version 6f the tax code
limits deductibility of interest on a home equity loan by means of the
$100,000 cap,216 it nevertheless provides an incentive to taxpayers to
place liens on their homes to secure debt that would not otherwise
have to be secured by the taxpayer's home. As Senator Bumpers of
Arkansas has said:
[W]e will be encouraging homeowners to take second and third
mortgages on their homes, which I question as public policy. I
predict we'll soon see checking accounts and credit card accounts
based on home mortgages. The purpose of this bill is to discourage
tax-motivated behavior but with the elimination of the consumer
interest deduction we may well see one of the most bizzare [sic] tax-
motivated borrowing system [sic] ever imagined.217
2. Effect of the Home Equity Interest Deduction
Senator Bumpers was correct in his assessment of the
proliferation of home equity financing after tax reform.21 8 The
General Accounting Office (GAO) determined in its report on home
equity financing that recent growth in the amount of home equity
financing was attributable at least in part to the revised tax law.
219
213. See H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 841, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 1-5 (1986),
reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4076, 4089-93; see also C. EUGENE STEUERLE, THm TAX
DECADE: How TAXES CAME TO DOMINATE THE PuBLIC AGENDA 136 (1991) ('The rate
reduction... lowered the inherent subsidy to borrowing.").
214. See H.R. CoNF. RE. No. 841, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 5-7 (1986),
reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4076,4093-95; see also GAO REPORT, supra note 17, app.
m, at 63 ("[A]n increase in the size of the standard deduction... reduced the advantage of
itemizing for lower income households and lessened the tax incentive for this group to
borrow."); STEumRLE, supra note 213, at 137 ('The increase in the standard deduction meant
that there was a significant decrease in the number of individuals who [itemized].").
215. See I.R.C. § 163(h)(1), (2) (1988); see also GAO REPOR, supra note 17, app.
III, at 62 (providing evidence of the decrease in nonmortgage interest since 1986).
216. See I.R.C. § 163(h)(3)(C)(ii).
217. 132 CONG. REC. 13,602 (1986) (statement of Sen. Bumpers).
218. See supra notes 25-34 and accompanying text.
219. GAO REPORT, supra note 17, at 1. Other factors contributing to the growth of
home equity financing include increasing home values, changes in banking law, and
aggressive marketing tactics by lenders. See id.; supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text.
414 [Vol. 69
HOME EQUITY FINANCING
Although the increase in the amount of home equity financing
clearly was underway before the changes in tax law became
effective,22 ° tax law revisions contributed to the sustained growth
rate through the late 1980S.221 It is difficult to measure the precise
effect of tax reform because tax return forms do not provide a line
item for home equity interest separate from other home mortgage
interest.222 The GAO, nevertheless, found evidence that taxpayers
were substituting nondeductible personal interest for deductible
home equity interest.223
Senator Bumpers also was correct when he predicted the advent
of checking and credit card accounts secured by home equity as
home equity lines of credit can be set up to be drawn upon by either
224check or credit card. The recent growth of debt in the form of
home equity lines of credit has been more dramatic than the growth
of traditional home equity loans.225  Lender advertising of this
product proliferated after the tax law was revised,226 and the changes
in the tax law were clearly a factor in the growth of this type of
credit.
227
It is unclear whether the home equity interest deduction
encourages homeowners to borrow when they otherwise would not,
but it is certain that homeowners are using the home equity loan
vehicle for borrowing that might otherwise be unsecured or secured
by collateral other than a home.228 Lenders have advertised the tax
220. Total home equity debt was $221 billion in 1986. GAO REPORT, supra note 17,
at 13.
221. Il at 8.
222. See GAO REPORT, supra note 17, app. 11, at 60.
223. See kL app. m1, at 60-64. The total amount of nonmortgage interest rose until
1986 and then began to decline. Id. app. III, at 60. Mortgage interest as a percent of
adjusted gross income has risen since 1986 in an amount similar to the increase in
nonmortgage interest as a percent of adjusted gross income. Id.
224. See AMERCAN BANKERs ASS'N, supra note 44, reprinted in Hearing on Home
Equity Loans, supra note 39, at 63; Glenn B. Canner et al., Home Equity Lines of Credit,
1988 FED. REsERv BUL. 361,362.
225. The increase in traditional home equity debt from 1986 to 1991 was $44 billion,
while the increase in the amount of home equity lines of credit during the same period was
$92 billion. See GAO REPoRT, supra note 17, at 8.
226. See Hearing on Home Equity Loans, supra note 39, at 4 (statement of Rep.
Price), 19 (statement of Martha R. Seger, Member, Bd. of Governors, Fed. Reserve System).
227. See GAO REPORT, supra note 17, app. IV, at 67.
228. Id. app. H, at 59-62.
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advantages of home equity financing and have offered loans aimed
specifically at taking advantage of the home equity interest
deduction. 2 29 Homeowners have attempted to take full advantage of
the tax deduction by converting outstanding debt to home equity
debt and by using the home equity loan vehicle for additional
borrowing when possible.
The effect of current tax law in increasing home equity
borrowing is particularly troublesome in light of the tendency of
individuals to underestimate the risk of a home equity loan.
230
Homeowners tend to choose home equity financing over other types
of consumer loans to gain the current tax deduction while
underestimating the risk of losing their homes to foreclosure. This
incentive provided by the federal government as a reward to those
who choose home equity financing over other types of consumer
credit therefore induces homeowners to enter into transactions that
are riskier than they might imagine. Thus, some homeowners lose
their homes as a result of tax-motivated home equity borrowing.
231
229. Sovran Bank, for example, advertised a 'TaxSmart Auto Loan," which was
secured primarily by the automobile purchased with proceeds of the loan and also by a
nominal home mortgage lien taken only to make interest on the loan deductible. Catherine
Hubbard, Home Equity Loans Draw Renewed Concern, 52 TAX NOTES 872, 873 (1991).
Sovran did not require an appraisal of the home or title insurance as would be the case if
Sovran were relying on the home to secure the loan. See Rob Bennett, Taxwriters v.
Copywriters, 50 TAXNOTS 1543, 1544 (1991).
230. See supra notes 46-57 and accompanying text.
231. Although the Texas Constitution prohibits home equity financing, see supra note
207 and accompanying text, Texas homeowners may have ended up with the best of both
worlds. The legislative history of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 indicated that the
requirement that home equity indebtedness be secured by the taxpayer's home was not
affected by the fact that state law might make the security interest unenforceable. See H.R.
CoNF. REP. No. 841, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 156 (1986), reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4076, 4244. In 1988, Congress enacted a technical corrections bill that
codified this intent in the Internal Revenue Code. See Technical and Miscellaneous
Revenue Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-647, tit. I, § 1005(c)(8), 102 Stat. 3342, 3391
(codified at I.R.C. § 163(h)(4)(C) (Supp. 11989)). Texas homeowners, therefore, may be
able to obtain a tax deduction for home equity interest without risking their homes.
Unfortunately, lenders may be reluctant to take an invalid lien on a Texas borrower's home
because the Texas Consumer Credit Commissioner has opined that this would be an unfair
trade practice on the part of the lender, even when the instrument creating the security
interest notes its invalidity. 86-6 Op. Tex. Off. Consumer Credit Comm'r 5 (Dec. 16, 1986).
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B. Federal Preemption of State Consumer Protection Laws
1. DIDMCA
Congress has preempted certain state laws affecting home
mortgage financing in order to provide for optimal functioning of the
home mortgage market . 32 However, the effect of the preemption
has not been limited to the purchase money mortgage market. The
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has held that
federal preemption of state usury ceilings on loans secured by a first
lien on residential real estate is not limited to loans made for the
purchase of a home.233 Therefore, there is no limitation on the
interest rate that a lender may charge on a home equity loan if it is
secured by a first lien on the borrower's home.
In Smith v. Fidelity Consumer Discount Co., a lender required
borrowers to grant first liens against their homes to secure loans
made at exorbitant interest rates for purchases of used cars.234 One
borrower was required to pay off existing debts secured by his home
with proceeds from the new loan which carried a higher interest rate
than the existing loans. 235  The lender claimed that state usury
236prohibitions were preempted under DIDMCA, and the court
reluctantly agreed.237  The court based its holding on the plain
language of the statute, on the legislative history, and on Federal
Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB) regulations and interpretations of
the statute.238 First, the court found that the statutory language,
which reads "any loan . . . secured by a first lien on residential
property," encompassed the transactions at issue in the case.239 In
addition, because the legislative history of the statute indicates
Congress' intent to enhance the stability of financial institutions as
well as to promote home ownership, the legislative history is
232. See supra part mI.C.
233. See Smith v. Fidelity Consumer Discount Co., 898 F.2d 907,912 (3d Cir. 1990);
Bank of New York v. Hoyt, 617 F. Supp. 1304, 1310 (D.R.I. 1985). Contra Mitchell v.
Trustees of U.S. Mut. Real Estate Inv. Tr., 375 N.W.2d 424,431 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985).
234. 898 F.2d 907, 909 (3d Cir. 1990). See infra notes 323-327 and accompanying
text for additional discussion of the facts of the case.
235. Smith, 898 E2d at 909.
236. See supra part 1.B.1.
237. See Smith, 898 F.2d at 909.




consistent with the literal reading of the statute. 24  Furthermore,
regulations and official interpretations are consistent with the literal
language of the statute.241 Finally, an opinion of FHIBB's counsel,
though unofficial, provides that federal preemption is not dependent
"on the purpose to which loan proceeds were put."242 Therefore, the
federal preemption of state usury law is applicable to a home equity
loan if the lender has a first lien on the borrower's home, and a
lender can obtain a first lien simply by requiring the borrower to pay
off existing liens with proceeds of the home equity loan.
243
Many states have usury ceilings that would prohibit a home
equity lender from charging an exorbitant interest rate without
requiring a first lien in order to fit within the federal preemption.
244
There are, however, other states in which lenders can charge
exorbitant interest rates on home equity loans regardless of the
federal preemption. Some states have eliminated interest rate
ceilings either generally or for residential mortgage loans;245 and
deregulation of interest rates in many of these states occurred around
the same time that DIDMCA was passed.24 6 With prevailing interest
rates approaching or exceeding state usury ceilings, state legislatures
were concerned with credit availability for their residents, and some
overreacted by eliminating usury ceilings rather than raising them.
2. AMTPA
Like DIDMCA, AMTPA 47 is not limited in its application to
purchase money mortgages. AMTPA, which preempts state
consumer credit laws restricting alternative mortgage financing
240. M at911-13.
241. See id. at 913 (citing 12 C.F.R. § 590.2 (1994) and Fed. Home Loan Bank Bd.
Interpretation No. 590-2, 45 Fed. Reg. 6165, 6166 (1980)).
242. Id. at 913-14 (quoting Op. Off. Gen. Counsel, Fed. Home Loan Bank Bd., No.
S. 5 (June 2, 1980)).
243. The Dunckels' lender required that existing financing be paid off with loan
proceeds as a condition to making the loan.
244. See, e.g., ARK. CoNsT. art. XIX, § 13; CAL. CoNSr. art. XV, § 1; DEL CODE
ANN. tit. 6, § 2301(a) (1993); LA. CI. CODE ANN. art. 2924C (West Supp. 1994); WASH.
REv. CODE ANN. § 19.52.020(1) (West 1989).
245. See, e.g., ARMZ. RE. STAr. ANN. § 44-1201 (1994); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch.
107, § 3 (West 1985); NEV. RE. STAT. § 99.050 (1991); N.H. Ra. STAT. ANN. § 336:1
(1984); UTAH CODE ANN. § 15-1-1(1) (1992).
246. See, e.g., 1980 Ariz. Sess. Laws ch. 200, § 9, at 569; 1981 N.H. Laws 348.
247. See supra notes 138-140, 149-154 and accompanying text.
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arrangements such as variable interest rate loans and balloon
payments, 24s applies to any "loan or credit sale secured by an interest
in residential real property."249 AMTPA was enacted to insure a
sufficient quantity of credit secured by residential real estate.250
Based on its stated purpose, AMTPA is not limited in its application
to home purchase money loans or even to loans secured by a first
lien on a home. Since AMTPA preempts state laws that restrict
alternative forms of home equity financing as well as alternative
forms of purchase money financing, home equity loans may have
variable interest rates, balloon payments, negative amortization, and
other terms typical of alternative mortgage loans.
3. The Free Market Myth in Home Equity Financing
While federal preemption of state usury ceilings and state
restrictions on alternative mortgage financing is one of the causes of
the predatory lending problem,251 there are other causes including
state deregulation of interest rates2 52 and borrowers' lack of access to
mainstream lending institutions.2 53 One of the assumptions behind
deregulation of interest rates at both the state and federal level was
that competition in the marketplace would keep interest rates at
market levels.254  This has been the case with respect to home
purchase financing2 55 but not with respect to home equity financing
available to some segments of our populace.25 6  While most
homeowners can obtain home equity financing at market rates, the
market has failed for other homeowners.
248. See 12 U.S.C. § 3803 (1988 & Supp. 11989).
249. Id. § 3802(1) (1988).
250. See id. § 3801(a)(2).
251. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
252. Hearing on Credit, supra note 64, at 1-2 (statement of Steven D. Caley, Atlanta
Legal Aid Soc'y); Hearings on Problems in Lending, supra note 63, at 256 (statement of
Kathleen Keest, Nat'l Consumer Law Ctr.).
253. See Hearing on Credit, supra note 64, at 2 (statement of Steven D. Caley,
Atlanta Legal Aid Soc'y); infra notes 259-267 and accompanying text.
254. See NATIONAL COMM'N ON CONSUMER FIN., CONSUMER CREDrr IN THE UNITED
STATES at iii, 12, 109-49 (1972); Thomas A. Durkin, An Economic Perspective on Interest
Rate Limitations, 9 GA. ST. U. L. Rv 821, 833 (1993).
255. See Durkin, supra note 254, at 833.
256. See supra part II.C.
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The failure of the market is caused in part by the homeowners
who borrow at exorbitant interest rates. These homeowners may be
unsophisticated, lacking the information necessary to make a prudent
borrowing decision,257 or they may be high-risk borrowers who are
desperate to obtain credit at any price.25' To a great extent, the
failure of the market to regulate interest rates for home equity loans
is not caused by the borrowers, but rather by the lenders. Borrowers
in low-income communities simply do not have alternatives to high
interest rate predatory loans. This lack of alternatives is a result of
redlining-mainstream lenders' refusal to lend in low-income and
minority neighborhoods. 259
Recent data indicates that redlining is still a problem. Most
mainstream mortgage lenders are required to report information on
credit denial under the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA).
260
HMDA data for 1990, made available in October 1991, indicates a
257. See generally Robin A. Morris, Consumer Debt and Usury: A New Rationale
for Usury, 15 PEPP. L. RE. 151, 170-73 (1988) (discussing different types of borrowers who
are benefitted by usury laws). Borrowers may not be aware of the interest rate that they are
paying on a home equity loan because of misrepresentation by a broker or lender or because
of practices that encourage borrowers to execute documents without being aware of their
terms. See supra notes 80-82 and accompanying text. In some cases the problem may not
be a lack of information, but rather an information overload. See Eskridge, supra note 144,
at 1133; Morris, supra, at 159.
258. See Morris, supra note 257, at 174.
259. Redlining is a
[tierm used to refer to a pattern of discrimination in which financial institutions
refuse to make mortgage loans, regardless of [the] credit record of the applicant,
on properties in specified areas because of alleged deteriorating conditions. At
one time, lenders actually outlined these areas with a red pencil. Such practice
violates federal laws.
BLACK'S LAW DIcrnONARY 1279 (6th ed. 1990) (citing 12 U.S.C. §§ 2801-2811 (1988)).
"'Redlining' means 'mortgage credit discrimination based on the characteristics of the
neighborhood surrounding the would-be borrower's dwelling."' Cartwright v. American
Say. & Loan Ass'n, 880 F.2d 912, 913 n.1 (7th Cir. 1989) (quoting Thomas v. First Fed.
Sav. Bank, 653 F Supp. 1330, 1337 (N.D. Ind. 1987)); see also Conference of Fed. Say. &
Loan Ass'ns v. Stein, 604 F.2d 1256, 1259 (9th Cir. 1979), aff'd, 445 U.S. 921 (1980);
Town of Springfield v. McCarren, 549 R Supp. 1134, 1142 (D. Vt. 1982), aff'd, 722 F.2d
728 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 942 (1983); Laufman v. Oakley Bldg. & Loan Co., 408
F Supp. 489,494 (S.D. Ohio 1976).
260. 12 U.S.C. §§ 2801-2810 (1988 & Supp. 1 1989). Those institutions that are
subject to HMDA reporting requirements include banks, savings associations, credit unions,
and other major mortgage lending institutions with $10 million or more in assets or with a
branch or office in a metropolitan area. See 12 C.FR. § 203.3 (1994).
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substantially greater rate of credit denial for minority applicants.26'
Lenders have argued that the data fails to take into account factors
such as credit histories and loan-to-value ratios that could explain the
262higher credit denial rates for minorities. However, a study by the
Federal Reserve Bank of Boston indicates that minority mortgage
loan applicants in the Boston area were roughly sixty percent more
likely to be turned down for credit even after adjusting for such
factors.
263
Even for the minority borrower who might be approved for a
market rate loan with a mainstream lender, there is a problem of lack
of access. Mainstream financial institutions that lend money at
market rates tend to shun inner-city neighborhoods occupied by poor
and minority homeowners. 264  They seldom have branches in
minority neighborhoods; their downtown and suburban offices with
sleek interiors, formal loan officers, and complicated application
processes may be intimidating and overwhelming. 265  In contrast,
finance companies and other fringe lenders that make high interest
rate loans come to the borrower's home, fill out the paperwork, and
266promise approval by the next day. The practice by predatory
lenders of targeting poor, minority, and elderly borrowers has been
appropriately termed "reverse redlining.
' 267
While mainstream lenders may not have made high interest
loans themselves, they nevertheless have been involved in
261. See AUciA H. MUNNEL ET AL, MORTGAGE LENDING IN BosroN: INTERPRETiNG
HMDA DATA I (Fed. Reserve Bank of Boston Working Paper No. 92-7, 1992), reprinted in
Hearings on Probliems in Lending, supra note 63, at 762,763. The data shows that minority
mortgage loan applicants were two to three times as likely to be denied credit. Id.
262. Id.
263. Id at 1-2, reprinted in Hearings on Problems in Lending, supra note 63, at 763-
64. Lending discrimination continues to be a problem despite the Fair Housing Act, 42
U.S.C. § 3605 (1988), which prohibits discrimination in residential real estate lending on
the basis "of race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin," id., and
the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a) (1988), which prohibits
discrimination in any credit transaction "on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin,
sex or marital status, or age," id
264. See Hearings on Problems in Lending, supra note 63, at 308 (statement of Scott
Harshbarger, Att'y Gen., Commonwealth of Mass.).
265. See Gary Chafetz, The March of the Mortgage Firms, BOSTON GLOBE, May 28,
1991, at 1, 21.
266. Id
267. See SENATEREPORT, supra note 63, at 21-22.
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facilitating such loans. Banks in many cases have provided
financing to predatory lenders or have purchased high interest rate
loans from such lenders, thus providing the funds that permit
predatory lenders to make high interest rate loans.26' Banks have
even been accused of using loans purchased from predatory lenders
to satisfy their obligations under the Community Reinvestment Act
(CRA)269 to lend in minority communities. 270  Purchasers of
predatory loans often rely on the holder-in-due-course doctrine,
which under certain circumstances permits note purchasers to take
notes free from personal defenses27 1  such as fraud in the
inducement, 272 lack of consideration, 273 or unconscionability 27 4 The
268. See Hearings on Problems in Lending, supra note 63, at 308 (statement of Scott
Harshbarger, Att'y Gen., Commonwealth of Mass.); Hearing on Credit, supra note 64, at 3-
4 (statement of Steven D. Caley, Atlanta Legal Aid Soc'y).
269. Congress enacted the Community Reinvestment Act of 1977 (CRA), Pub. L. No.
95-128, 91 Stat. 1111 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 2901-2906 (1988)), in an
attempt to discourage redlining. The CRA provides that "regulated financial institutions
have continuing and affirmative obligation [sic] to help meet the credit needs of the local
communities in which they are chartered." Id. § 2901(a)(3). The CRA directs regulators to
examine an institution's record of meeting the credit needs of its community, but does not
mandate any penalty for non-compliance other than a direction that regulators consider the
institution's record in granting or denying certain applications made by the institution. See
id. § 2903. Because of the CRA's lack of teeth, the bill was described as "a 'sensitizing' tool
intended to 'raise the consciousness' of lenders and regulators, and gently lead them toward
a greater awareness of urban lending needs." WARREN L. DENNIS & J. STANLEY POTrINGER,
FEDERAL REGULATION OF BANING: REDLmNG AND COMMUNrrY RE , srmNr [ 9.05, at
9-22 (1980). However, the CRA was amended in 1989 to require public disclosure of CRA
ratings. Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act, Pub. L. No. 101-73,
§ 1212, 103 Stat. 183, 526-28 (1989) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 2906 (Supp. 11989)).
270. Rep. Joseph P. Kennedy II of Massachusetts has been quoted as saying, "We
may be looking at some sort of perverse incentive under CRA for banks to purchase loans in
minority communities to fulfill CRA obligations." Steve Marantz, US Panel To Hold
Hearing on 2d Mortgage-Bank 7Yes, BOSTON GLOBE, May 8, 1991, § 3, at 19. However,
William Spring, Vice President of the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, was not aware of
any banks using high-interest rate loans purchased from second mortgage companies on
their CRA compliance statements. See id.
271. See U.C.C. § 3-305 (1990). A holder in due course of a negotiable instrument is
a holder who takes the instrument for value, in good faith, and without notice of certain
matters, such as a claim to it or a defense against it. See id § 3-302(a).
272. See FDIC v. Kratz, 898 F.2d 669, 671 (8th Cir. 1990); Federal Nat'l Mortgage
Ass'n v. Gregory, 426 F. Supp. 282, 284-85 (E.D. Wis. 1977); Myers v. Bank of Prattville,
341 So. 2d 726, 727 (Ala. 1977); Austin v. Atlas Subsidiaries, 223 So. 2d 297, 298 (Miss.
1969); NELSON & WHrTMAN, supra note 40, § 5.31, at 363.
273. See Manufacturers & Traders Trust Co. v. Murphy, 369 F. Supp. 11, 14 (W.D.
Pa. 1974); Mozingo v. N.C. Nat'l Bank, 229 S.E.2d 57, 62 (N.C. Ct. App. 1976), cert.
denied, 232 S.E.2d 204 (N.C. 1977); NELSON & WHrrMAN, supra note 40, § 5.31, at 364.
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holder-in-due-course doctrine therefore removes much of the
incentive of a note purchaser to investigate the originator or its
practices where the purchaser qualifies for holder-in-due-course
status. Mainstream lenders, whose absence from poor and minority
communities has permitted the proliferation of predatory lending,
can purchase predatory loans with impunity and thus support the
predatory lending market.
C. Bankruptcy Law
1. Bankruptcy Code Provisions Promoting Home Equity
Financing
Like DIDMCA and AMTPA, the Bankruptcy Code promotes
home equity financing because its provisions supporting the
mortgage market are not limited in their effect to purchase money
mortgages. The antimodification provision of Section 1322(b)(2)
applies to any loan "secured only by a security interest in real
property that is the debtor's principal residence." 275 Most courts
addressing the scope of the provision have held that protection
against modification under Section 1322(b)(2) is not limited to
purchase money mortgagees.27 6 The majority of these holdings are
based on the plain language of the statutory provision. 277 Although
some courts have been critical of the overbreadth of the provision,
274. See Slaughter v. Jefferson Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 361 F Supp. 590, 598
(D.D.C. 1973), rev'd on other grounds, 538 F.2d 397 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Grarnatan Co. v.
D'Aniico, 269 N.YS.2d 871, 872-73 (App. Div. 1966); NELSON & WHrMAN, supra note
40, § 5.31, at 364.
275. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) (1988).
276. See Davis v. Allied Credit Corp. (In re Davis), 989 F2d 208, 210 (6th Cir.
1993); Rubottom v. Metro. Mortgage & Sec. Co. (In re Rubottom), 134 B.R. 641, 643-44
(Bankr. 9th Cir. 1991); In re Boisvert, 156 B.R. 357, 359 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1993); In re
Braylock, 120 B.R. 61, 62 (Bankr. N.D. Miss. 1990); In re Marrero, 111 B.R. 384, 386-87
(Bankr. D.P.R. 1990); In re Diquinzio, 110 B.R. 628, 629 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1990); In re Harris,
94 B.R. 832, 837 (D.N.J. 1989); In re Hobaica, 65 B.R. 693, 694-95 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y.
1986); In re Bradshaw, 56 B.R. 742,746-47 (S.D. Ohio 1985); In re Coffey, 52 B.R. 54,55-
56 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1985); In re Hubbard, 30 B.R. 39,40 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1983).
277. See Davis, 989 F2d at 210; Boisvert, 156 B.R. at 359; Braylock, 120 B.R. at 63;
Marrero, 111 B.R. at 386-87; Diquinzio, 110 B.R. at 629; Harris, 94 B.R. at 837; Hobaica,
65 B.R. at 695; Bradshaw, 56 B.R. at 744-46; Coffey, 52 B.R. at 55-56; Hubbard, 30 B.R.
at 40.
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they have felt compelled to give effect to its unambiguous
language.
278
Other courts have asserted that the antimodification provision
of Section 1322(b)(2) is applicable only to long-term purchase
money financing.279 Although there is no explicit legislative history
on point, the basis of these holdings is the presumed intent of
Congress in creating the antimodification exception. 2 0 Some courts
have concluded:
278. See Diquinzio, 110 B.R. at 629; In re Allen, 75 B.R. 344, 346 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio
1987).
279. See In re Williams, 109 B.R. 36,42 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1989); Capitol Credit Plan
v. Shaffer, 116 B.R. 60, 62 (W.D. Va. 1988), appeal dismissed, 912 F.2d 749 (4th Cir. 1990);
In re Simmons, 78 B.R. 300, 303 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1987); In re Morphis, 30 B.R. 589, 592-
93 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1983); In re Neal, 10 B.R. 535, 540-41 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1981);
United Cos. Fin. Corp. v. Brantley, 6 B.R. 178, 189 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1980).
280. See Williams, 109 B.R. at 42; In re Shaffer, 84 B.R. 63, 66 (Bankr. W.D. Va.),
aff'd sub nom. Capitol Credit Plan v. Shaffer, 116 B.R. 60 (W.D. Va. 1988), appeal
dismissed, 912 F2d 749 (4th Cir. 1990); Simmons, 78 B.R. at 301; Morphis, 30 B.R. at 593;
Neal, 10 B.R. at 538-40; Brantley, 6 B.R. at 189.
A review of the legislative history of the section indicates that the House version of §
1322(b)(2) provided that a Chapter 13 plan could modify any secured claim, H.R. 8200,
95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1322(b)(2) (1977), whereas the Senate version of the section
followed provisions of the old Bankruptcy Act in permitting modification only of claims
secured by personal property, S. 2266, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. § 1322(b)(2) (1978). The final
compromise as to the language of the provision, which permitted modification of secured
claims except those secured only by the debtor's principal residence, was reached after
testimony from representatives of the home mortgage industry that permitting modification
of home mortgage loans in Chapter 13 would have an adverse impact on the availability of
home mortgage credit. See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978: Hearings on S. 2266 and H.R.
8200 Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Comm. on
the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 707, 714 (1977) (statement of Edward J. Kulik, Senior
Vice President, Real Estate Div., Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co.); id. at 715 (statement of Robert
E. O'Malley, att'y, Covington & Burling). Therefore, it might be reasonable to presume that
its purpose was to give special protection to the long-term home mortgage industry "because
of the valuable social service it provides: fulfilling the American dream of owning your own
home." Capital Credit Plan, 116 B.R. at 61 (citing Grubbs v. Houston First Am. Say. Ass'n,
730 F.2d 236, 246 (5th Cir. 1984)). On the other hand:
Mhat primary focus does not ipso facto mean that Congress could not have also
intended in its final legislative product to prevent the use of Chapter 13
proceedings to modify all secured claims against residential property when no
other collateral was involved. Congress may have merely concluded that the
simple Chapter 13 procedures were not appropriate for such modifications-
leaving such modifications to Chapter 11 where there is no prohibition.
Moreover, when Congress wanted to limit avoidance provisions with regard to
purchase-money transactions it knew how to use that specific language.
In re Coffey, 52 B.R. 54,55-56 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1985) (citing 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(2)(1988)).
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Although the legislative history is silent, the plain intent of the
exception is to provide stability in the residential long-term home
financing industry and market. It is to specifically protect
institutional lenders engaged only in providing long-term home
mortgage financing and not lenders primarily engaged in consumer
or other areas of financing but who take security interests in a
residence or homestead to secure non-home financing debts .281
Although some courts have asserted that Section 1322(b)(2) is
inapplicable to short-term consumer loans secured by home
equity,2 82 most of them relied on this proposition as one of several
alternative bases for a holding 8 3 or made the statement as dictum.28 4
Only one case appears to rest squarely on the inapplicability of
Section 1322(b)(2) to a short-term consumer loan as the basis for its
holding.2 5 Therefore, the antimodification provision of Chapter 13
is probably applicable to home equity loans.
Congress recently amended Chapter 13 to permit modification
of a loan secured by the debtor's principal residence if "the last
payment on the original payment schedule... is due before the date
on which th& final payment under the plan is due.' 286 This provision
would appear to permit modification of any home mortgage loan,
whether for purchase of the home or otherwise, if its remaining term
281. Brantley, 6 B.R. at 189, quoted in Shaffer, 84 B.R. at 65; see also In re Bruce,
40 B.R. 884, 886 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1984); Morphis, 30 B.R. at 593.
282. See supra note 279 and cases cited therein.
283. Some of the cases involved a loan that was not within the scope of the
antimodification provision because it was secured by collateral in addition to the debtor's
principal residence. See Morphis, 30 B.R. at 594; Brantley, 6 B.R. at 189-90. Other cases
dealt with an undersecured loan, and courts found that § 1322(b)(2) did not prohibit
modification of the unsecured portion of the indebtedness. See Simmons, 78 B.R. at 303;
Morphis, 30 B.R. at 594; Neal, 10 B.R. at 540; see also Bruce, 40 B.R. at 888 (holding that
§ 1322(b)(2) did not prohibit modification of a second lien loan that was wholly unsecured
because of insufficient equity in the property to support a second lien). Note that the
Supreme Court has since held that bifurcation of an undersecured loan into secured and
unsecured claims is impermissible. See Nobelman v. American Say. Bank, 113 S. Ct. 2106,
2111 (1993).
284. See Williams, 109 B.R. at 42 (holding that the debtor's Chapter 13 provided for
a permissible cure rather than an impermissible modification).
285. Capitol Credit Plan v. Shaffer, 116 B.R. 60, 61-62 (W.D. Va. 1988), appeal
dismissed, 912 E2d 749 (4th Cir. 1990).
286. See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, § 301(2), 108 Stat.
4106, 4131 (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. § 1322(c)(2)).
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is less than the term of the debtor's Chapter'13 plan.287 Since the
application of the new provision depends only on the term of the
loan, not on the use of loan proceeds, the antimodification provision
apparently remains applicable to longer term home equity loans.288
There are Bankruptcy Code provisions other than the
antimodification provision that give a creditor with a lien on the
debtor's home more protection in bankruptcy than other secured
creditors. A debtor may avoid a non-purchase money lien against
certain types of exempt personal property such as household
furnishings, appliances, and clothing held for personal, family, or
household use,289 but may not avoid a non-purchase money lien on
the exempt portion of the homestead. In addition, a Chapter 7 debtor
may redeem tangible personal property intended for personal, family,
or household use by paying a creditor with a security interest in that
property an amount equal to the value of the property,290 but a debtor
may not redeem a home by paying the home mortgage lender its
value.
291
The inapplicability of the avoidance and redemption provisions
to mortgage lenders gives them a greater degree of protection, but
the reason for the different treatment is more related to special
problems associated with personal property than to promotion of
292stability in home mortgage financing. Most property held for
personal, family, or household use is of much greater value to the
debtor than to creditors since the value of such property to the debtor
is its replacement cost. To creditors, on the other hand, the value of
287. The maximum term of a Chapter 13 plan is three years unless the court, for
cause, approves a longer term, which may not exceed five years. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(c)
(1988) (redesignated as subsection (d) by the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No.
103-394, § 301(1), 108 Stat. 4106, 4131). Most home purchase money loans are originally
for a term exceeding five years. However, some purchase money loans provide for a balloon
payment within the first five years. The original term of a home equity loan may similarly
vary.
288. See infra part V.D.1.
289. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(f (1988).
290. See id. § 722.
291. See Dewsnup v. 'imm, 112 S. Ct. 773,778-79 (1992). This prohibition against
lien stripping in Chapter 7 applies to any lien on real property, id., and presumably to a lien
on personal property other than tangible personal property intended for personal, family, or
household use. However, in the bankruptcy of a homeowner, the home is likely to be the
only encumbered property that may not be redeemed.




such property is its market value, and used household items and
clothing typically have very little value in the marketplace.
293
Creditors formerly required a security interest in all of a debtor's
belongings, not because of the value of the collateral, but because the
threat of repossession provided a useful technique for coercing
borrowers into making payments. Congress adopted the avoidance
and redemption provisions applicable to property held for personal,
family, or household use to curb this abuse.294  Unlike used
household items and clothing, a home has the same pecuniary value
to both debtor and creditor,295 and a lien on a home has value to a
creditor other than for purposes of coercion. Therefore, the
distinction in treatment of home mortgage lenders and other secured
consumer lenders can be justified on a basis unrelated to the stability
of the home mortgage market.
2. Effect of Bankruptcy Law Provisions
While bankruptcy law gives home mortgage lenders protection
unavailable to other creditors, it gives homeowners little protection
beyond that provided under state law.296 Bankruptcy protection is
particularly limited for homeowners who have encumbered the
exempt portion of a homestead. Nevertheless, many homeowners in
financial distress try to forestall bankruptcy by borrowing against the
equity in their homes without realizing all of the ramifications of a
297home equity loan. A homeowner may be aware of the risk of
293. See SULLVAN, WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 43, at 202. Professors
Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook give the example of a shirt worn by the debtor only twice.
See id. It would be worth $30 to the debtor, who would have to spend that much to replace
it, but "would be worth only a couple of dollars at a garage sale, if it were sold to pay debts."
Id.
294. See H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 127 (1977), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6088. Federal law now protects consumers from this practice even
outside of bankruptcy because a Federal Trade Commission Credit Practices rule, 16 C.FR.
§ 444.1-.5 (1994), makes it an unfair practice for a lender to take a nonpossessory, non-
purchase money security interest in certain household goods. See id. § 444.2(a)(4).
295. Of course, a home may have great sentimental value to a debtor, and this may
explain the propensity of debtors to go to great lengths to retain possession of their homes in
bankruptcy. See infra note 309.
296. SuLLIvAN, WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 43, at 138.
297. See id. at 136.
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default and foreclosure298 but is unlikely to know of the bankruptcy
consequences of home equity borrowing. A homeowner who takes
out a home equity loan to pay bills or consolidate debts changes the
character of the debt for purposes of bankruptcy law in a manner that
is to the homeowner's disadvantage.
First, by granting a lien on a home, a homeowner is
encumbering an asset that would otherwise be exempt to the extent
allowed by state law or the Bankruptcy Code2 99 and is therefore
making retention of the home subject to the payment of the debt
secured thereby. A bankruptcy trustee will sell a Chapter 7 debtor's
home to satisfy unsecured creditors only if the debtor's equity in the
home exceeds the homestead exemption.300 When a creditor has a
valid contractual lien on the home, however, the bankruptcy trustee
either will sell the home to satisfy the lien or will abandon the home
to the creditor for foreclosure unless the debtor reaffimns the debt by
agreeing to pay the debt in full on its original terms.301 A Chapter 13
plan may provide for "cram down" of unsecured claims while
permitting the debtor to retain the home if the debtor's home equity
does not exceed the homestead exemption or if the debtor agrees to
pay to unsecured creditors an amount not less than the amount by
which home equity exceeds the homestead exemption, plus
interest.30 2 A Chapter 13 plan, however, must provide for payment
in full of a home mortgage creditor regardless of the homestead
298. Some homeowners may be unaware of the possibility of foreclosure as a
consequence of securing a loan with a lien on the home. See HOBBS ET AL, supra note 16, at
50.
299. See supra notes 155-158 and accompanying text.
300. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 522, 704(1), 726 (1988); In re Johnson, 30 B.R. 467, 469
(M.D. Tenn. 1983); EPSTEiN ET Al, supra note 155, § 8-13, at 495. Outside of bankruptcy,
unsecured creditors may force the sale of a debtor's home only if the debtor's equity in the
home exceeds the amount of the homestead exemption. See id § 8-1, at 450.
301. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 506, 554. In fact, a debtor in bankruptcy has no right to
reaffirm a debt if the creditor is not agreeable to a reaffirmation. EPSTEIN Er AL, supra note
155, § 7-39, at 415. But see SULU~VAN, WARREN & WEmTBRoOK, supra note 43, at 145 n.10:
Although technically the Bankruptcy Code accelerates and causes all debt
obligations to be in breach, both in practice and, in some courts, by judicial
decree, the debtor who is current on a secured loan will probably not face losing a
home so long as the debtor continues to make payments as originally scheduled.
In Chapter 13, a debtor can require a home mortgage lender to be paid in accordance with
the original terms of the debt. See infra notes 302-303 and accompanying text.
302. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1322, 1325.
428 [Vol. 69
HOME EQUITY FINANCING
exemption if the debtor is to retain possession of the home.
30 3
Therefore, it is to a homeowner's disadvantage to take out a home
equity loan to pay bills or to consolidate unsecured debts. By
postponing bankruptcy with a home equity loan, the homeowner is
converting fully dischargeable debts into debt that cannot be
discharged in bankruptcy without loss of the home.
In addition, by granting a lien on a home, a homeowner is
placing the home equity lender in a better position in bankruptcy
than other secured creditors. A homeowner in bankruptcy may avoid
a non-purchase money lien against certain types of exempt personal
property, but may not avoid a non-purchase money lien against the
exempt portion of a homestead. 304 A Chapter 7 debtor may strip
down a lien on tangible personal property intended for personal,
family, or household use and redeem it by paying its value, but may
not strip down an undersecured lien on a home.30 5 Finally, a Chapter
13 plan may provide for the modification of secured claims other
than loans secured only by a lien on the debtor's home.30 6  As a
result of the special treatment given home mortgage lenders, a
homeowner who wants to retain possession of a home in bankruptcy
must pay a home equity loan in accordance with its original terms.
307
More than half of all consumer bankruptcies involve
308homeowners, most of whom go to great lengths to retain
ownership of their homes. 309 It could be argued that homeowners in
bankruptcy should be required to pay their debts to the extent
possible and that the loss of a home is not too great a sacrifice if it
enables a debtor to pay debts. However, this argument goes against
303. See id § 1322(b)(2).
304. See supra note 289 and accompanying text.
305. See supra notes 290-291 and accompanying text.
306. See 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2). The types of modification available with respect to
other debt would include reducing the interest rate to a market rate, extending the term of the
loan, stripping down the lien to the value of the collateral, and reducing the payment amount
by any of the foregoing means. See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
307. See 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2). A Chapter 13 debtor is permitted to cure pre-
bankruptcy defaults during the term of the plan. See id § 1322(b)(3)-(5).
308. SLUJaVAN, WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 43, at 129.
309. Id at 134. Despite the risk of perjury or denial of discharge, many debtors fail to
report their home mortgages in bankruptcy to keep their home mortgage lender from finding
out about the bankruptcy. ML at 134-35. Judges and attorneys have been willing to "look
the other way" even in cases in which other portions of the bankruptcy file indicate the
existence of a home mortgage debt. d
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the fresh start policy of bankruptcy, which permits a debtor to
discharge debts and retain exempt assets.310 Because of the special
treatment of home mortgage lenders in bankruptcy, a homeowner
facing foreclosure of a home equity mortgage may find a bankruptcy
filing to be of little benefit. The only advantage of a bankruptcy
filing would be the delay of foreclosure resulting from the automatic
stay3 1 and the ability to cure pre-bankruptcy defaults over the term
of a Chapter 13 plan.312 Therefore, a homeowner who takes out a
home equity loan to forestall bankruptcy may lose the benefit of the
fresh start. On the other hand, a homeowner who files bankruptcy
rather than encumbering exempt home equity when debts become
overwhelming can take full advantage of the bankruptcy fresh start
by discharging debts and retaining a home.
One would think that a rational homeowner would rush to the
bankruptcy court if the burden of unsecured debt became over-
whelming and would never encumber exempt home equity.313 in
fact, the opposite is true. Few people file bankruptcy,314 and many
home-owners encumber their homes to pay or consolidate unsecured
debts rather than filing bankruptcy.315 Professors Sullivan, Warren,
and Westbrook suggest that the factors that may deter a debtor from
filing bankruptcy are the possibility of forfeiture of property,
insufficient information, the stigma of bankruptcy, and a moral
310. See supra part II.D.
311. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(5) (1988).
312. See id. § 1322(b)(5).
313. See Suu.IVAN, WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 43, at 336. This is the
"moral hazard" argument made by economists. Cf A. MIrCHELL POuNsKY, AN
INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 56 (2d ed. 1989) (stating that the availability of
insurance creates a moral hazard "because the insured person has less of an incentive to take
precautions" to avoid a loss). If the cost to a debtor of discharge is too low, bankruptcy
becomes a moral hazard by shifting the risk of poor credit decisions off debtors. See
JACKSON, supra note 94, at 250.
314. SuLuvAN, WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 43, at 336.
315. Id. at 136. Professors Sullivan, Warren, and Westbrook comment on this
phenomenon as follows:
The high proportion of multiple mortgages suggests that homeowners in
bankruptcy may have tried to forestall financial collapse by borrowing against
their homes. By using a second or third mortgage to raise cash, a homeowner can
continue to feed a family and meet payments even when income is interrupted.
The bankruptcy files may be, in part, the stories of debtors who planned to use
debt during a rough time, but whose debts mounted too quickly until the risk of
losing their homes overwhelmed them.
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commitment to pay debts. 316 The relative effect of each of these
factors is impossible to measure. Professors Sullivan, Warren, and
Westbrook discount the problem of lack of information in a time
when every television guide is full of advertisements for bankruptcy
attorneys.317 Lack of information, however, may be a significant
problem for homeowners who encumber their homes with debt as an
alternative to bankruptcy.
While borrowers are unlikely to realize the bankruptcy
disadvantages of taking out a home equity loan, lenders often take
full advantage of the preference given home mortgage lenders in
bankruptcy. In response to the favored treatment in Chapter 13 of
loans secured by a debtor's principal residence, there is a trend
among consumer lenders to take a mortgage on a home as the only
security for a loan.3 18 Lenders who might otherwise have required a
borrower to grant a security interest in a car or other personal
property are willing to forego this additional security in order to fit
within Section 1322(b)(2)'s prohibition against modification.
319
Because of the Supreme Court's holding that lien stripping of an
undersecured home mortgage is not permissible in Chapter 13,320 a
lender could conceivably take a mortgage on a home solely for the
purpose of preventing modification of the loan in a Chapter 13
bankruptcy even though the lien might have little or no economic
value based on a lack of equity in the home. Such a lender, with
what is in reality an unsecured or undersecured loan, could then
require that the debtor in bankruptcy, in order to keep the home, pay
the entire amount of the debt, an amount more than the lender could
realize through foreclosure. This protection against lien stripping
given to holders of unsecured or undersecured junior liens has been
criticized by consumer groups and the National Bankruptcy
Conference as impairing the value of the debtor's discharge in
316. Id. at336.
317. Il
318. See In re Bradshaw, 56 B.R. 742,746 (S.D. Ohio 1985).
319. Id.; see also Smith v. Fidelity Consumer Discount Co., 898 F.2d 907, 909 (3d
Cir. 1990) (involving loans made for the purchase of used cars but secured only by a
borrower's or cosigner's home).
320. Nobelman v. American Say. Bank, 113 S. Ct. 2106 (1993); see supra notes 169-
170 and accompanying text.
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bankruptcy and giving an unfair advantage to an undeserving class of
lienholders.
321
D. Interaction of Federal Measures Promoting Home Equity
Financing
The consequences to a homeowner of the interaction of the
different provisions of law that encourage home equity financing are
apparent in the bankruptcy arena. The interaction of the provisions
of DIDMCA and the Bankruptcy Code that promote home equity
financing is particularly troublesome, as illustrated by two recent
United States Court of Appeals cases. 322  In Smith v. Fidelity
Consumer Discount Co., Fidelity made loans for the purchase of
used cars by homeowners or their family members.323 Fidelity
required the homeowners to grant first liens on the homes to secure
the loans.324  In order to satisfy existing liens against one home,
Fidelity loaned funds at an interest rate higher than the rates on the
loans being paid off.325  In addition, it appears from the court's
recitation of the facts that Fidelity did not take a security interest in
321. See Cramdowns of Residential Real Estate Mortgages in Chapter 13
Bankruptcies: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Administrative Practice of the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 28-34 (1991) (statement of Henry J.
Sommer, Staff Att'y, Community Legal Servs.); BANKRurrcy REFORM CIRCA 1993: A
PRESENTATION OF THE NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY CONFERENCE'S CODE REVIEW PROJECr 156-
57 (AL-ABA Comm. on Continuing Prof. Educ. 1993); Winn, supra note 170, at 574.
Congress considered bankruptcy reform legislation between 1991 and 1994. Bills
introduced in both the House and the Senate at various times limited the protection of
unsecured or undersecured junior lienholders against modification in Chapter 13. See S.
540, version 4, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 307 (1994); H.R. 2326, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(g)
(1993); H.R. 6020, 102d Cong., 2nd Sess. § 202 (1992); S. 1985, version 4, 102d Cong., 1st
Sess. § 310 (1991). For example, one version of the bankruptcy reform bill passed only by
the Senate would have modified § 1322(b)(2) to provide that a Chapter 13 plan "may
modify the claim of a person holding such a junior security interest that was undersecured at
the time the interest attached to the extent that the interest remains undersecured." S. 540,
version 4, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 307 (1993). However, the bill that Congress ultimately
enacted did not contain such a provision. See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No.
103-394, § 301, 108 Stat. 4106 (to be codified in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C.).
322. See Allied Credit Corp. v. Davis (In re Davis), 989 E2d 208 (6th Cir. 1993);
Smith v. Fidelity Consumer Discount Co., 898 E2d 907 (3d Cir. 1990) [hereinafter Smith
II]; Smith v. Fidelity Consumer Discount Co., 898 F2d 896 (3d Cir. 1990) [hereinafter
Smith I]; see also supra notes 234-243.




the used cars purchased with the loan proceeds.326 The interest rates
on the loans ranged from approximately 31 percent to approximately
41 percent, 327 but the court held that DIDMCA preempted state
usury laws.
328
Fidelity apparently structured its loans to take full advantage of
federal protection granted to home equity lenders. Fidelity required
first liens on the homes to avoid state usury limitations under
DIDMCA, and it likely took the homes as its only security in order
to fit within the antimodification provision of Chapter 13. If these
homeowners should fall behind in making payments on the loans,
they would receive no advantage from a bankruptcy filing other than
delay of foreclosure resulting from the automatic stay329 and, in
Chapter 13, the right to cure a default.33 ° In Chapter 7, the
homeowners would have to reaffirm the loans in order to retain
possession of their homes; in Chapter 13, their plans could not
provide for reduction of the extraordinarily high interest rates to a
market interest rate.331 If the high interest rates made the loans truly
unaffordable for these homeowners, then the delay of foreclosure
and the right to cure a default would not make a bankruptcy filing
worthwhile since foreclosure ultimately could not be avoided.
Bankruptcy therefore would provide no meaningful protection for
these homeowners.
In Allied Credit Corp. v. Davis, Allied Credit had a second lien
on the debtor's home to secure a loan with an annual percentage rate
of 21.5 percent, a rate apparently permitted under Tennessee law.
332
The debtor's proposed Chapter 13 plan would have modified the
loan to provide for an interest rate of 10 percent. 333 The court, in
holding that the plan could not be confirmed, stated:
326. See id.; Smith 1, 898 F.2d at 899,902.
327. Smith II, 898 F2d at 909.
328. Id at 914. See supra notes 232-243 and accompanying text for a discussion of
the preemption of state usury laws.
329. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(5) (1988).
330. See id. § 1322(b)(5).
331. See supra notes 299-303 and accompanying text.
332. 989 F2d 208,208 (6th Cir. 1993).
333. Id. at 210. Since the Allied Credit Corp., 989 F.2d 208 (6th Cir. 1993), case did
not involve a first lien, it was not a case in which the requirement of a lien on the home was
motivated by the lender's desire to escape state usury law under DIDMCA. It is illustrative,
however, of the inability of a Chapter 13 debtor to reduce the interest rate on a home equity
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Although we express a belief that the interest rate charged by Allied
Credit on the principal loan is exorbitant, that opinion does not
constitute a reason to remove Allied Credit from the protection to
which Congress has entitled it. As we have concluded that Allied
Credit is within the class of creditors protected by § 1322(b)(2), its
claim cannot be modified by the debtor's proposed plan under
Chapter 13.
The high interest rate on the loan in the Allied Credit Corp. case was
not the result of DIDMCA, but there are cases in which lenders have
required a first lien in order to fit within the preemption provisions
of DIDMCA and legally charge an exorbitant interest rate.
335
Homeowners cannot look to bankruptcy law to modify high interest
rate loans and thus protect their homes, and this ability of predatory
home equity lenders "to hide behind the antimodification provision
of § 1322(b)(2) is particularly offensive to public policy.
336
The consequences of the interaction of tax law and bankruptcy
law provisions that encourage home equity financing are also
disturbing. In some cases, a homeowner's granting of a lien on a
home may be motivated by a desire to deduct interest on the loan.
For example, a homeowner might take out a home equity line of
credit rather than borrowing against credit cards because interest on
the home equity loan would be deductible. If the homeowner's
financial situation changes and a bankruptcy becomes necessary, the
home equity debt cannot be discharged upon payment of less than its
full amount or upon terms other than its original terms as could
unsecured credit card debt.337 This result is particularly troublesome
in light of the tendency of individuals to underestimate the risks that
their current consumption imposes upon their future well-being.
33 8
In the context of the home equity loan, this tendency would cause
loan. The author has been unable to find a reported bankruptcy case in which a court
discusses DIDMCA as the basis for permitting an exorbitant interest rate on a home equity
loan while denying the right to modification in Chapter 13 because of the lien on the home.
It may be that any such cases are unreported because of a lack of controversy over the
prohibition of modification as applied to a first lien home loan, or it may be that
homeowners in such situations do not file bankruptcy because of the lack of benefit they
would receive therefrom.
334. Id. at 213.
335. See supra notes 234-243 and accompanying text.
336. Winn, supra note 170, at 584.
337. See supra notes 301-303 and accompanying text.
338. JACKSON, supra note 94, at 239; see supra notes 46-57 and accompanying text.
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individuals to choose home equity financing over another type of
consumer loan to provide a current tax deduction while
underestimating the risk of losing their homes to foreclosure. As the
law currently stands, the federal government encourages
homeowners to choose home equity financing over other types of
consumer credit but eliminates the protection that bankruptcy law
would offer had the homeowner chosen another type of financing.
V. CRAFTING A SOLUTION
Congress has recently focused on some of the consequences of
the various federal measures that promote home equity financing.
Members of the House Ways and Means Committee, concerned with
the rising use of home equity loans to fund consumer purchasing,
requested that the GAO provide a study of home equity financing.
With the GAO report now published, Congress may consider
legislation directed at changing the tax law.339 Congress recently
enacted legislation that addresses the predatory lending problem,
though not sufficiently.340 In addition, Congress recently passed a
bankruptcy reform bill that amends the Bankruptcy Code provision
prohibiting modification of home mortgage loans, though it does not
fully correct problems created by the provision.34' Congress has not
focused on the relationship between the various measures that
promote home equity financing, nor has Congress made any
comprehensive analysis of the federal policies affected by the
encouragement of home equity financing. In the remainder of this
Article, I will address the problem of how to balance these various
federal policies and propose a comprehensive set of legislative
proposals aimed at achieving a more appropriate balance.
A. Balancing of Competing Policies
1. Home Ownership and Credit Availability
While the federal government's promotion of home equity
financing undermines its policy favoring home ownership, it could
be rationalized if it were shown to promote a competing federal
339. See infra part V.B.1.
340. See infra part V.C.1.
341. See infra part V.D.1.
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policy. The federal government has been involved in making credit
available to the American public for the purchase of homes, 342 as
well as for other purposes.343 Thus, an argument can be made that
federal encouragement of home equity financing promotes credit
availability. Such an argument, however, is unpersuasive. First, tax
reform measures discouraged consumer borrowing by lowering tax
rates, increasing the standard deduction, and phasing out the
deductibility of consumer interest. 344  The deductibility of home
equity interest was maintained primarily as a compromise
measure.345 Second, the legislative histories of DIDMCA and the
Bankruptcy Code indicate that a primary concern of Congress in
giving special favors to home mortgage lenders was to make home
purchase money credit available.346 In fact, the federal measures that
promote home equity financing are not aimed at increasing the
overall availability of credit but rather at encouraging borrowers and
lenders to choose the home equity loan structure for consumer
financing transactions. Although a policy favoring credit availability
may explain why the federal government does not prohibit or
discourage home equity financing, it does not explain why the
federal government encourages homeowners and lenders to choose
the home equity loan structure as the vehicle for consumer
borrowing over other types of consumer loans.
There are good reasons from both borrowers' and lenders'
perspectives to use home equity financing,347 but the federal
government should not artificially encourage use of the home equity
loan vehicle rather than other types of consumer credit. An
argument can even be made that the federal government should
discourage home equity financing, thus protecting the home and
furthering the federal home ownership policy. This is the approach
taken in Texas, a state that provides far greater protection of the
342. See supra part I.A.
343. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1464(a) (1988) (stating that one purpose of thrift
institutions is to provide "for the extension of credit for homes and other goods and
services").
344. See supra notes 213-215 and accompanying text.
345. See supra notes 195-209 and accompanying text.
346. See supra notes 145-148, 280-281 and accompanying text.
347. See supra notes 42-45 and accompanying text.
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home against execution by creditors than any other state348 and that
takes the paternalistic approach of protecting homeowners from their
own folly by prohibiting home equity loans altogether. Since Texas
homeowners may grant liens on their homes only to secure a loan for
purchase money, improvements, or payment of property taxes, home
equity loans are not available. 349  Therefore, Texas homeowners
cannot mortgage their homes to support consumption, a decision
they would regret if their homes were lost to foreclosure.
Although Texas takes the approach that protection of the home
is more important than availability of credit to homeowners, the
federal government need not take such a paternalistic view. The
federal government should not prohibit or even discourage home
equity financing because home equity loans may be the only means
by which some homeowners can obtain needed credit. Senators
arguing for an unlimited right to deduct home equity interest,
although not making a pariicularly sound case for the deduction,35
did make a compelling argument for permitting homeowners to
borrow against the equity in their homes. Homeowners may need a
home equity loan to pay medical or educational expenses, to help
their children purchase a home, to provide financial assistance to
aging parents, to save a family business, or to deal with other family
348. In Texas the homestead exemption protects an urban homestead on as much as
an acre of land, regardless of its value. See Tax. PROP. CODE ANN. § 41.002(a) (West Supp.
1995). Texas law protects a rural homestead on as much as 200 acres of land for a family or
as much as 100 acres for a single adult. See id § 41.002(b). Florida has a similar
exemption scheme but protects a lesser amount of property. See FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4;
supra note 162.
349. See Tax. CONST. art. XVI, § 50; TEx. PROP. CODE ANN. § 41.001(b) (West Supp.
1995). Proponents of home equity lending have introduced a bill to permit home equity
loans during almost every regular session of the Texas legislature since 1979, but thus far the
bills have failed to pass. TaxAs HOUSE RESEARCH ORGANIZATION, SPECIAL LEGISLATVE
REPoRir SECOND MORTGAGES AND THE TEXAS HOmSTmEAD EXEMPTION 19 (1988). The
United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals recently held that federal regulations and
AMTPA preempted Texas homestead law to the extent that Texas law prohibited reverse
annuity mortgages and line of credit conversion mortgages. First Gibraltar Bank, FSB v.
Morales, 19 F.3d 1032, 1052-53 (5th Cir. 1994). Subsequently, Congress amended the
Home Owner's Loan Act to provide that regulators had no authority to supersede Texas
homestead law. See Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994,
Pub. L. No. 103-328, § 102(f), 108 Stat. 2338, 2352; H.R. CONF. REP. No. 651, 103d Cong.,
2d Sess. 57 (1994). By extension, AMTPA also does not supersede Texas homestead law.
Id. at 57-58.
350. See supra notes 205-208 and accompanying text.
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emergencies.5 1 In some cases, a home equity loan may be the only
credit available for these purposes.352 Despite the fact that
homeowners may underestimate the risks accompanying a home
equity loan, there are cases in which a homeowner should choose to
borrow against home equity. The federal government should not
take away the option of home equity financing based on a
paternalistic view that government must protect homeowners against
the risks of a home equity loan. In fact, by eliminating some of the
preferential treatment given to home equity lenders, the risks of a
home equity loan could be lessened. Elimination of federal
preemption of consumer protection measures for home equity loans
would permit states to prohibit unfair home equity credit terms.
Likewise, elimination of the preferential treatment of home equity
lenders in bankruptcy would increase the availability of the fresh
start to home equity borrowers. To attain an appropriate balance
between federal policies favoring home ownership and credit
availability, the federal government should not create artificial
incentives favoring home equity loans but instead should let market
forces influence the decision as to how consumer borrowing should
be structured. While federal law should be amended to eliminate
laws that promote home equity financing, it should not go so far as
to discourage home equity loans.
2. The Fresh Start and Credit Availability
The fresh start policy of bankruptcy is adversely affected by the
federal government's promotion of home equity financing and must
be considered in formulating a proposal. In general, the ability of
debtors to protect assets in bankruptcy requires the balancing of the
fresh start policy with the policy favoring credit availability.353 More
specifically, the ability of a home equity borrower to protect the
home in bankruptcy depends upon the balancing of the need for
home equity credit and the need for preserving the home as a part of
the fresh start. Measures that grant preferential bankruptcy treatment
to home equity lenders over other consumer lenders, however,
promote the home equity vehicle for consumer credit rather than the
'351. See supra note 206 and accompanying text.
352. 132 CONG. REc. 13,593-94 (1986) (statement of Sen. Boren); id. at 13,597-98
(statement of Sen. Durenberger); id. at 13,600 (statement of Sen. Chaffee).
353. See Jackson, supra note 55, at 1439.
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overall availability of consumer credit and therefore cannot be
rationalized on the basis of a policy favoring credit availability.
The fresh start policy is achieved by discharging a debtor from
most existing debts while permitting the debtor to retain exempt
assets,354 but there are exceptions to the availability of discharge and
to a debtor's ability to retain exempt assets. For example, a debtor
may not be discharged from a debt arising out of fraud,355 and
generally a debtor may not retain exempt assets without paying
purchase money debt secured by a lien on the property.356 These
exceptions are based on important public policies. 357 The fresh start
policy should not be frustrated, however, by exceptions for which
there is no rational basis. Exceptions that provide special protection
for home equity lenders fall within this category.
In order to appropriately balance the competing federal policies
affected by home equity financing, Congress must adopt measures
designed to eliminate federal promotion of home equity financing.
Congress should: (1) eliminate special tax treatment of interest paid
on home equity indebtedness by making such interest nondeductible;
(2) permit states to regulate interest rates by narrowing federal
preemption of usury ceilings to apply only to purchase money loans;
and (3) amend the Bankruptcy Code to permit modification of home
equity loans in Chapter 11 and Chapter 13 and lien stripping of home
equity loans in Chapter 7. In addition, Congress must insure that
credit on fair terms is available to borrowers in all communities.
B. Tax Law
1. Congressional Concern
Members of the House Ways and Means Committee, the
committee in which tax bills must originate, recently have expressed
354. See supra notes 95-96 and accompanying text.
355. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2) (1988).
356. A debtor may not avoid purchase money liens on exempt property as is the case
with certain types of exempt personal property. See id. § 522(f). A debtor may, however,
strip down such liens to the fair market value of the property in both Chapter 7 and Chapter
13 bankruptcies. Id. §§ 722, 1322(b)(2).
357. The non-dischargeability of debt arising out of fraud is designed to deter such
conduct. JACKSON, supra note 94, at 274. Exempt assets remain subject to purchase money




concern about the increasing use of home equity loans rather than
other forms of consumer credit and about lenders' advertising the tax
advantages of home equity loans.358 In 1991, one committee
member introduced a bill that would have limited the home equity
interest deduction to loans secured only by a lien on a home.
359
Another committee member requested that the GAO perform a study
of home equity financing to determine the reasons for its growth and
to examine any problems caused by home equity loans.360 The GAO
Report is now complete, and Congress can move forward in revising
the tax law.
2. Recommendation
Congress should eliminate the favored treatment of home
equity interest by treating home equity interest the same as other
consumer interest. If deduction of consumer interest is permitted, it
should be permitted for all taxpayers;36 1 if deduction of consumer
interest is denied, it should be denied for all taxpayers, regardless of
the structure of the indebtedness. Assuming consumer interest
remains nondeductible, the deduction for home equity interest
should be eliminated.
The deductibility of interest on a home equity loan is unfair to
renters and to those homeowners without substantial equity in their
homes362 because homeowners who have equity in a home can
deduct interest paid on a consumer loan by securing it with home
363equity while renters and homeowners without equity cannot. One
of the traditional tests of fairness of an income tax system is
358. See Hubbard, supra note 229, at 872.
359. See H.R. 2458, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
360. GAO REPORT, supra note 17, at 1.
361. See Snoe, supra note 120, at 497.
362. See 132 CONG. REc. 14,520 (1986) (statement of Sen. Levin); Snoe, supra note
120, at 491; Robert J. Wells, It's 7me to Revisit the Interest Deduction Rules, 60 TAX NOTES
649, 652-53 (1993).
363. It is often upper-income taxpayers who own a home with sufficient equity to
take advantage of the home equity interest deduction. See Wells, supra note 362, at 652.
The increase in the standard deduction under the Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-
514, § 102, 100 Stat. 2085, 2099-2102 (codified as amended in scattered sections of I.R.C.),
is another factor that has shifted the benefit of the home mortgage interest deduction for
home equity and acquisition indebtedness to higher-income taxpayers. Low- and middle-
income taxpayers are now less likely to have sufficient deductions to justify itemizing. See
Poterba, supra note 188, at 239.
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horizontal equity, which requires that taxpayers with equal incomes
pay the same amount in taxes.3 4 Since taxpayers who have equity
in a home are treated differently in their ability to deduct consumer
interest from taxpayers who do not have equity in a home, the test of
horizontal equity is not met. A lack of horizontal equity should be
justified only when a tax expenditure promotes some rational federal
policy other than raising of revenue. For example, the deductibility
of home purchase money interest is directly related to the federal
policy of promoting home ownership.365 Since the deductibility of
home equity loan interest does not in an appropriate way promote
any rational policy of the federal government, it should not be an
exception to the general rule of horizontal equity.
Some may argue that the tax deduction for interest on a home
equity loan is related to the federal policy favoring home
ownership,366 but even if it does marginally promote home
ownership, it is not an appropriate means. Other measures
promoting home ownership do so by making home ownership
possible for those who might not otherwise be able to purchase a
home. The deduction for interest on a home purchase money loan
reduces the cost of purchasing a home, and the deduction for
property taxes reduces the cost of owning a home. Federal mortgage
insurance programs and federal government participation in the
secondary market make financing more available. Measures that
benefit home mortgage lenders are designed to make financing less
expensive for most homeowners. The federal income tax deduction
for interest on a home equity loan might be classified as an
inducement to home ownership since taxpayers arguably may
purchase homes to attain the benefit of being able to deduct
consumer interest secured by a lien on the home. This inducement,
however, rather than making it less expensive to purchase, to
364. 1 BrrKER & Lo)KN, supra note 129, 1 3.1.4, at 3-10.
365. 2 d 31.5, at 31-74.
366. See 132 CONG. REc. 13,594 (1986) (statement of Sen. Boren) (stating that a
proposed amendment limiting deduction of home equity interest "is an undue restriction on
the ability of the American people to dip into their savings represented by the equity value of
their home"); id. at 13,598 (statement of Sen. D'Amato) (stating that a proposed amendment
limiting deduction of home equity interest "is a home ownership crusher"); id at 13,599
(statement of Sen. Abdnor) (stating that dollars lost because of inability to deduct home
equity interest "might have been ... use[d] on a payment for a house").
1994]
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finance, or to own a home, rewards those who have successfully
purchased and built up equity in a home with the gift of deductibility
of home equity interest. For some homeowners, the gift turns out to
be a Trojan horse when economic disaster strikes and the home
equity lender forecloses. A deduction for home equity interest is an
inappropriate means to promote home ownership and is not related
to any other policy of the federal government.
In determining the deductibility of interest, the relevant factor
should be the use of borrowed funds rather than the structure of the
indebtedness.367 If Congress wants to promote home ownership by
encouraging taxpayers to borrow money to purchase, build, or
substantially improve a home, then providing for the deductibility of
interest on such loans may be a rational use of tax policy to
368accomplish that goal. Similarly, if Congress wanted to encourage
people to attend college, then deductibility of interest on educational
loans might further that goal. As the law stands, Congress is
encouraging taxpayers to use a particular structure for indebtedness
rather than encouraging them to borrow for a particular purpose, and
no legitimate federal goal is served by the home equity loan
structure. The law must therefore be changed to eliminate the
disparate treatment of consumer indebtedness secured by home
equity and other consumer indebtedness by eliminating the
deduction for home equity interest.
Elimination of the home equity interest deduction would not be
difficult to implement or enforce.3 69  Current law distinguishes
between acquisition indebtedness, which is used for purchase,
construction, or substantial improvement of a home,370 and other
home mortgage indebtedness, different caps being provided for the
367. This is the approach taken by Congress in determining the deductibility of
interest in most cases. See 26 C.ER. § 1.163-8T(a)(s) (1994); Snoe, supra note 120, at 489-
90.
368. However, the deductibility of home mortgage interest may only promote home
ownership among middle class and wealthy taxpayers. See supra note 188 and
accompanying text.
369. Unfortunately, the GAO Report concludes that disallowance of the deduction for
home equity interest would cause enforcement difficulties. See GAO REPORT, supra note
17, at 23-24. Although the authors of the report seem to have a good understanding of tax
law, they apparently do not understand the mechanics of home improvement lending, for
they reach the wrong conclusion.




different types of indebtedness.37' While loan proceeds generally
may be difficult to trace, tracing should not be difficult with home
purchase money, construction, and improvement loans because
lenders do not typically pay proceeds of these types of loans to the
borrowers. Loan proceeds go to the seller through an escrow agent
in the case of a purchase money loan and often go directly to the
contractor in the case of a construction or improvement loan. With
refinancing of acquisition indebtedness, the lender pays the
refinanced portion to the former lender through an escrow agent.
Since lenders would have the information necessary to report interest
paid on acquisition indebtedness separately from other home
mortgage indebtedness, 372 the elimination of the home equity interest
deduction should not cause enforcement difficulties and therefore
would be the best means to eliminate the inequity of current tax law.
C. Predatory Lending
1. Recent Legislation
In reaction to widespread reporting of the problem of predatory
lending in the media373 and the work of a number of dedicated
consumer protection organizations, 374 Congress recently enacted the
371. Compare I.R.C. § 163(h)(3)(B)(ii) (1988) (providing for a $1,000,000 limitation
on acquisition indebtedness) with I.R.C. § 163(h)(3)(C)(ii) (1988) (providing for a $100,000
limitation on home equity indebtedness).
372. The lender's ability to report might provide a means for determining when home
improvement is "substantial improvement." See supra note 125. With very small loans
made for home improvement, lenders are unlikely to be as concerned that proceeds are
actually used for home improvement. With more substantial sums, lenders have an interest
in seeing that loan proceeds are spent to improve the home.
373. The Boston Globe ran a series beginning in May 1991, see Chafetz & Canellos,
supra note 85, at 1, and continuing through the year, see Peter S. Canellos, Of Banks, Condo
Kings, Urban Blacks and Cash, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 29, 1991, at 1. 60 Minutes broadcast
a program in November 1992. See 60 Minutes: A Matter of Interest (CBS television
broadcast, Nov. 15, 1992).
374. The Union Neighborhood Assistance Corporation, the National Consumer Law
Center, the Atlanta Legal Aid Society, and other organizations have provided assistance to
victims of predatory lending as well as testimony at Congressional hearings. See, e.g., The
Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act of 1993-S. 924: Hearing Before the Senate
Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1993)
(statement of Margot Saunders, Managing Att'y, Nat'l Consumer Law Ctr.).
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Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act of 1994375 as a part of
the Riegle Community Development and Regulatory Improvement
Act of 1994.376 The Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act
requires additional disclosures and prohibits certain unfair terms in
connection with a closed-end home equity loan with an annual
percentage rate more than 10 percentage points greater than the rate
on a Treasury security of comparable maturity or with points and
fees exceeding the greater of 8 percent of the loan amount or
$400.3  The Act requires lenders to make the required disclosures
to the homeowner three days before the consummation of the home
equity loan and prohibits the lender from changing the terms of the
loan without giving new disclosures.378 The Act prohibits high
interest rate home equity loans with prepayment penalties in certain
circumstances, with balloon payments to be made less than five
years after the closing of the loan, or with negative amortization.
37 9
In addition, the Act prohibits lenders from making high interest rate
home equity loans without regard to the homeowner's ability to
repay.380 The Act provides for civil liability for non-compliance by a
lender with requirements of the Act, and it eliminates holder-in-due-
course status for purchasers of high interest rate home equity
loans.
381
The Act represents one step towards eliminating the problem of
predatory lending. Disclosures made to consumers prior to
consummation of high interest rate home equity loans will give
consumers better notice of unconscionable terms and the opportunity
to terminate the transaction. Furthermore, some of the more unfair
375. Pub. L. No. 103-325, tit. 1, subtit. B, 108 Stat. 2190 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1601-1648).
376. Pub. L. No. 103-325, 108 Stat. 2160. This Act is a comprehensive measure
dealing with the establishment of community development financial institutions, the
encouragement of small business capital formation, the improvement of federal banking
regulations, and other matters, as well as protection of homeowners against predatory
lending abuses. l
377. Pub. L. No. 103-325, § 152(a), 108 Stat. 2190,2190 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C.
§ 1602(aa)).
378. Id. § 152(d), 108 Stat. at 2191 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1639). The
required disclosures include the APR of the loan as well as the following: "If you obtain
this loan, the lender will have a mortgage on your home. You could lose your home, and
any money you have put into it, if you do not meet your obligations under the loan." Id.
379. Id., 108 Stat. at2192-93.
380. Id., 108 Stat. at 2193.
381. Ma. § 153, 108 Stat. at 2195-96 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1640-1641).
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terms of high interest rate home equity loans, including certain
prepayment premiums and early balloon payments, are prohibited
altogether. The Act does, however, have some limitations. First, it
does not apply to home equity lines of credit or to reverse
mortgages.38 In addition, it does not prohibit lenders from requiring
a borrower to pay off existing lower interest rate loans with a new
high interest rate home equity loan. Finally, it only applies to home
equity loans with particularly high interests rates or points,383 and it
does not prohibit high interest rates altogether.
The provision of the Act that could prove most effective in
curtailing predatory lending practices is the provision that makes
assignees of high interest rate loans subject to claims and defenses of
borrowers.384 Since predatory lenders are not regulated depository
institutions, their funds for making predatory loans have come
largely from banks and other regulated institutions.385  If these
institutions face the risk of borrower's defenses against payment,
they should take a greater interest in policing the activities of lenders
from whom they purchased loans. If banks and other financial
institutions become unwilling to provide funding for predatory
lenders to make loans, then the overall amount of predatory lending
may be seriously curtailed. If, however, financing from predatory
lenders should become unavailable, credit on fair terms must be
made available. Congress has also attempted to address the problem
of redlining as discussed below.
386
382. Id. § 152(a), 108 Stat. at 2190 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1602(aa)). Another
provision of the Act requires lenders to make certain disclosures in connection with reverse
mortgages, but no terms are prohibited in reverse mortgages. Id. § 154, 108 Stat. at 2196 (to
be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1602).
383. Id. § 152(a), 108 Stat. at 2190 (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1602(aa)).
384. ld. The effect of this provision is similar to that of the Federal Trade
Commission's trade regulation rule, 16 C.F.R. § 433.2 (1994), commonly known as the
"holder-in-due-course rule." The holder-in-due-course rule makes it an unfair trade practice
for a seller of goods or services, including home improvements, to finance a sale or to accept
loan proceeds from a lender that is affiliated with or refers customers to the seller unless a
required notice is included in the note evidencing the debt. See id. The required notice
makes the holder of the note "subject to all claims and defenses which the debtor could
assert against the seller," and therefore prevents a holder from asserting its immunity to such
claims or defenses as a holder in due course. Id.
385. See supra note 268.
386. See infra part V.C.3.
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Since the Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act regulates
high interest rate home equity loans by prohibiting certain unfair
terms, AMTPA's preemption of state laws regulating alternative
mortgage arrangements may be acceptable. However, because the
Act does not prohibit high interest rates altogether, continued
preemption of state usury laws affecting home equity loans is not
acceptable. Congress therefore should eliminate the federal
preemption of state usury ceilings with respect to home equity loans
so that states may regulate interest rates.387
2. Elimination of Usury Preemption
Economists tend to disfavor regulation of interest rates,
388
arguing that interest rate ceilings produce credit shortages, 389 reduce
competition, 390 and cause inefficiency 391  and negative
macroeconomic effects. 392  Economists generally agree, however,
that government intervention is appropriate in instances of market
failure, 393 and the problem of high interest rate predatory lending
represents a case of market failure.394 Since government regulation
is necessary to remedy the predatory lending problem, the question
387. In a survey of legal aid attorneys who work with the victims of predatory
lenders, most of the attorneys surveyed felt that the most effective means to deal with the
problem would be legislation capping interest rates and fees. See PuBLic CrriZEN, STEALING
THE AMERICAN DREAM: A SuRVEY OF LEGAL AID ATTORNEYs ON ABUSIVE HOME EQurrY
LENDING 24,31-32 (1994).
388. Durkin, supra note 254, at 821. Durkin quotes Milton Friedman as saying, "I
know of no economist of any standing... who has favored a legal limit on the rate of
interest that borrowers could pay or lenders receive--though there must have been some."
Id. (quoting Milton Friedman, Defense of Usury, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 6, 1970, at 79).
389. See William J. Boyes & Nancy Roberts, Economic Effects of Usury Laws in
Arizona, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 35, 60 (1981); Durkin, supra note 254, at 822-26; William D.
Warren, Consumer Credit Law: Rates, Costs, and Benefits, 27 STAN. L. REv. 951, 952, 964
(1975). Professor Warren describes the argument as follows: "he classic economic theory
of the effect of rate ceilings is that they tend to exclude from the legitimate credit market
those least likely to repay (those with the fewest assets) and those -most expensive to deal
with (those who borrow the smallest amounts) .... Warren, supra, at 952-53 (citing
George Stigler, The Law and Economics of Public Policy: A Plea to the Scholars, 1 J.
LEGAL STUD. 1, 6 (1972)).
390. See Durkin, supra note 254, at 827; Morris, supra note 257, at 155; Warren,
supra note 389, at 964.
391. See Boyes & Roberts, supra note 389, at 60; Durkin, supra note 254, at 822-26.
392. See Durkin, supra note 254, at 829. But see Morris, supra note 257, at 152
(arguing that usury laws have positive macroeconomic effects).
393. See ROBERT COOT & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMiCS 228-41 (1987).
394. See supra part IV.B.3.
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becomes what type of government intervention is best tailored to the
problem. Legislation recently passed by Congress rests upon the
view that additional disclosure to consumers in connection with high
interest rate loans, prohibition of particularly egregious abuses, and
additional measures aimed at ending redlining are a sufficient
response.395  However, because excessively high interest rates
themselves are abuses, usury limitations that prohibit exorbitant
interest rates should be permitted.396
The mortgage loan usury preemption provision of DIDMCA,
enacted for the dual purposes of stabilizing financial institutions and
promoting home ownership by making home mortgage money
available,397 should have been limited in its application to home
purchase money loans. Preemption of state usury laws for non-
purchase money first lien home mortgage loans has not furthered the
purposes of DIDMCA and, as previously discussed, has permitted
abuses by some home equity lenders.398 Since there is no reason to
treat first lien home equity loans differently from other types of
consumer credit for the purposes of usury law, states should be
permitted to determine whether and how to protect home equity
borrowers from exorbitant interest rates. The federal government
may have a great interest in regulating, or preempting regulation of,
the home purchase money finance market due to the federal policy
favoring home ownership and the current federal involvement in the
secondary mortgage market, but these concerns are not applicable to
home equity financing. Therefore, the usury ceiling preemption of
395. See supra part V.C.I. Additional disclosure requirements are aimed at solving
borrowers' information problems. Congress is also attempting to correct the market on the
supply side by addressing the problem of redlining. See infra part V.C.3. If market failures
could be eliminated entirely, then prohibition of unfair practices might be unnecessary.
396. The common law doctrine of unconscionability might provide another means to
protect against interest rates that shock the conscience of a court. See Comment, An Ounce
of Discretion for a Pound of Flesh: A Suggested Reform for Usury Laws, 65 YALE L.J. 105,
108 (1955) (arguing that general usury laws are ineffective and anachronistic). However,
such an alternative would be more expensive to enforce than usury laws and therefore less
efficient. Morris, supra note 257, at 153-54 n.12, 173-74.
397. See Smith v. Fidelity Consumer Discount Co., 898 F.2d 907, 911 (3rd Cir. 1990)
(quoting Bank of New York v. Hoyt, 617 F Supp. 1304, 1311 (D.R.I. 1985)); supra notes
145-148 and accompanying text.
398. See supra part II.C.
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DIDMCA should be restricted to apply only to home purchase
money loans rather than to all first lien home mortgage loans.
399
States should be permitted to regulate interest rates on home
equity loans, but the implementation of the usury limitations by
states deserves comment. In order to avoid interference with credit
markets, states should set usury ceilings high enough to permit
natural fluctuations reflecting financial market conditions yet low
enough to eliminate unconscionable rates.400 One particularly useful
device for avoiding interference with market forces is the floating
usury ceiling set at a fixed number of points over a floating index.
This type of usury ceiling would avoid the problems that precipitated
the enactment by Congress of the usury preemption provisions of
DIDMCA40 1 because the ceiling would rise and fall with
corresponding movements in the price of credit. A floating ceiling
would have the advantage of fitting prevailing rates more closely
than a fixed ceiling and, therefore, would control more cases of
unconscionable conduct than would a fixed ceiling set high enough
to avoid interference with the market.4 °2
Even a high floating usury ceiling may keep the highest risk
borrowers from receiving credit, but this paternalistic effect is
acceptable when a borrower's home is at risk.40 3 States should
protect borrowers from the folly of borrowing money at exorbitant
interest rates because they are better off not borrowing if the risk of
default is really so high.404  Although mortgage risk to lenders
399. An argument can be made for enacting a uniform federal usury ceiling rather
than leaving usury in the hands of the states. Cf Durkin, supra note 254, at 837 (arguing
that if usury ceilings are adopted they "should not vary by geographic area or state").
Adoption of a federal usury ceiling applicable to home equity loans makes little sense, and a
discussion of a comprehensive federal usury statute is beyond the scope of this Article.
400. See id. at 836.
401. See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
402. Because fixed usury ceilings must be set very high to avoid interference with the
market when it fluctuates, they prohibit only the most extreme cases of unconscionable
conduct by a lender. In addition, when interest rates rise drastically, as they did during the
late 1970s, even very high ceilings can interfere with the market.
403. See generally Anthony T. Kronman, Paternalism and the Law of Contracts, 92
YALE LJ. 763 (1983) (discussing economic efficiency and distributive fairness as
justifications for paternalism in cases in which there is a significant disparity in bargaining
power); Morris, supra note 257, at 158-59 (arguing that paternalism is appropriate to protect
the incapacitated borrower).
404. While high-risk borrowers are the least able to pay, they must pay the highest
interest rates because of their inability to pay. High interest rates result in high payments,
and high payments increase the risk of default. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
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depends on loan-to-value ratio, as well as a borrower's ability to
repay a loan,405 risk to borrowers depends only on the ability to repay
because loss of a home is one of the risks that borrowers seek to
avoid.406 Since a loan secured by a home with a low loan-to-value
ratio should not pose a great deal of risk to a lender, homeowners
with sufficient equity in their homes should have credit available at
reasonable interest rates, and homeowners without home equity or
the ability to repay should not be permitted to borrow. For these
reasons, a usury ceiling set high enough to avoid unconscionable
rates should eliminate the charging of exorbitant interest rates by
predatory lenders without unnecessarily interfering with market
forces.4 °7
3. The Challenge of Credit Availability
The problems of predatory lending and reverse redlining cannot
be solved by consumer protection measures alone. Protective
measures contained in the Home Ownership and Equity Protection
Act together with elimination of federal preemption of state usury
laws applicable to home equity loans would improve the situation.
However, if these measures are effective in making predatory
financing unavailable, mainstream lenders must fill the gap by
providing credit on fair and reasonable terms. Redlining must be
eliminated and fair credit made available in all communities. Only
then will the credit market function properly, allowing market forces
to drive predators out of the market.
President Bill Clinton made a commitment to promote the
establishment of community development financial institutions to
provide credit in distressed communities and to enhance the role of
405. See supra notes 37-41 and accompanying text.
406. A borrower who loses a home to foreclosure may "pay" a home equity loan in
full but sustain a loss due to loss of the home and perhaps loss of equity.
407. A potential problem with setting a high usury ceiling is that a high ceiling may
create a safe harbor for lenders to charge rates just beneath the ceiling and therefore to
continue to take advantage of borrowers. However, legislation similar to the Home
Ownership and Equity Protection Act could provide a middle tier of protection between
unregulated low interest rates and prohibited high interest rates by requiring extra
disclosures, prohibiting certain practices, and denying holder-in-due-course status with
respect to loans with interest rates in the middle range. See supra part V.C.l.
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traditional institutions in making such credit available.40 8  In
response, Congress enacted the Community Development Banking
and Financial Institutions Act of 1994.409 The Act establishes a
Community Development Financial Institutions Fund to invest in
and assist community development financial institutions that will
provide equity investments and credit in areas of economic distress
and to low-income persons. 410  In addition, the Act provides
incentives to traditional financial institutions to invest in community
development financial institutions.4 11 A full discussion of this Act
and its anticipated effect on the redlining problem is beyond the
scope of this Article. However, Congress and the President must
remain committed to insuring that credit on fair terms is available to
all members of our society.
D. Bankruptcy Law
Because of special treatment of home equity lenders in
bankruptcy, many homeowners unknowingly are impairing their
ability to have a fresh start in bankruptcy. Homeowners who secure
consumer debt with a lien on a home in order to deduct the interest
for tax purposes may recognize the risk of foreclosure but are
unlikely to recognize the bankruptcy consequences of a home equity
loan. Homeowners who finance home repairs or consolidate debts
with high interest rate home equity loans beyond their means also are
unlikely to have any comprehension of the repercussions under
bankruptcy law. The problem, however, is not merely lack of
information but that people refuse to believe that they may one day
need the protection of the bankruptcy safety net. Even with adequate
information about the bankruptcy implications of the home equity
loan, homeowners will continue to take out home equity loans for
reasons both related and unrelated to federal encouragement of home
equity financing, because the current year's tax deduction or a
pressing need for cash seems more real than the possibility of a
408. See Proposed Legislation: The Community Development Banking and
Financial Institutions Act of 1993, Message from the President of the United States, H.R.
Doc. No. 118, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 1(1993).
409. Pub. L. No. 103-325, tit. 1, subtit. A, 108 Stat. 2163.
410. Id. § 102(b), 108 Stat. at 2163, § 103(16), 108 Stat. at 2165-66, § 103(20), 108
Stat. at 2166, § 104(a), 108 Stat. at 2166, § 107(a), 108 Stat. at 2172.
411. Id. § 114,108 Stat. at2179-84.
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future bankruptcy.412 Since additional information will not solve the
problem, elimination of the special bankruptcy treatment of home
equity lenders is necessary. Congress should amend the Bankruptcy
Code to permit modification of home equity loans in Chapter 11 and
Chapter 13 and to permit lien stripping of home equity loans in
Chapter 7.
1. Recent Legislation
Congress recently amended the Bankruptcy Code to permit a
Chapter 13 plan to provide for the modification of a home mortgage
loan if the remaining term of the loan is less than the term of the
plan.413 This provision presumably will permit a Chapter 13 plan to
provide for the modification of a short term home equity loan to
lower its interest rate or to extend its term to the end of the term of
the plan.414 In addition, it presumably will permit lien stripping of a
short term home equity loan in those cases in which the amount of
the debt exceeds the value of the home.
415
New Bankruptcy Code section 1322(c)(2) prevents one abuse
by lenders of the antimodification provision. Lenders who make
short term consumer loans will no longer be able to obtain special
treatment in bankruptcy by securing such a loan with a lien on the
debtor's home.4t 6 However, many home equity loans are for terms
417longer than three or five years. These loans also should be subject
to modification in Chapter 13.
412. See supra note 338 and accompanying text.
413. See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, § 301, 108 Stat.
4106, 4131 (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. § 1322(c)(2)); supra notes 286-288 and
accompanying text.
414. See id. § 301,108 Sta. at4131.
415. See id.
416. See id.
417. See supra note 287. Even short-term loans present a problem under the new
scheme if they have a large balloon payment due at the end of the loan term. Since a
Chapter 13 plan may not provide for payments extending beyond the term of the plan, see 11
U.S.C. § 1322(c) (redesignated as subsection (d) by the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994,
Pub. L. No. 103-394, § 301(1), 108 Stat. 4106, 4131), a plan that modified a home equity
loan with a balloon payment might have to increase monthly payments during the term of
the plan or provide for a balloon payment due at the end of the plan. Such a plan is not
likely to be confirmed because the debtor is unlikely to be able to comply with the plan. See




While recent bankruptcy legislation limits the application of the
antimodification provision of Chapter 13, it does not sufficiently
curtail the special privileges granted to home equity lenders in
bankruptcy. Congress should limit the antimodification provision to
apply only to home purchase money, construction, or improvement
loans because there is no rational reason for extending the reach of
the provision to home equity loans. Since the reason for prohibiting
modification of home mortgage loans is to promote home ownership
by encouraging the flow of capital into the home mortgage
market,418 special treatment should not be extended to home
mortgage loans other than purchase money, construction, and
improvement loans.419 Home equity loans are just one vehicle used
by homeowners to obtain consumer credit and should not be treated
differently from other consumer loans. If other consumer loans, both
secured and unsecured, may be modified in Chapter 13, then
modification of home equity loans should also be permitted.
If home equity loans could be modified in Chapter 13, then a
Chapter 13 debtor could reduce the monthly payments on a home
equity loan by reducing the interest rate to a market rate or by
extending the term of the loan. This would provide protection to
consumers who find themselves unable to afford payments on home
equity loans with unfair terms such as exorbitantly high interest rates
or balloon payments required soon after the closing of the loan. In
addition, when the amount of the debt is in excess of the value of the
home, a homeowner could strip down home equity debt to the value
of the home. This result is particularly compelling in circumstances
in which the loan was unsecured or undersecured at the time it was
made.420 Even with a home equity loan that was fully secured at the
time it was made, there is no reason to require a homeowner to give
418. See supra notes 280-281 and accompanying text.
419. If the goal of Congress was to give special treatment to those lenders that enable
the purchase of a home, then § 1322(b)(2) fails in reaching its goal. It is too broad in one
sense because it protects lenders who take a lien on a home to secure a loan made for
purposes other than purchase of the home, and it is too narrow in another sense because it
fails to protect lenders who make purchase money loans but take additional security. See
NELSON & WHrMAN, supra note 40, § 8.15, at 655-57.
420. See supra notes 318-321 and accompanying text. A purchase money loan
should not by definition be undersecured at the time it is made because the purchase price in
an arms-length transaction is the best evidence of fair market value.
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up the home in order to gain the advantage of a discharge on a home
equity loan if the Chapter 13 plan provides for payment to the home
equity lender of an amount equal to the secured portion of the
loan.42' Since other secured consumer lenders, including purchase
money lenders, are subject to lien stripping in Chapter 13, there is no
logical reason to protect home equity lenders against lien stripping.
If bankruptcy law were amended to permit modification of
home equity loans, then the fresh start would be available to
homeowners who could keep their homes by reducing payments on a
home equity loan.422 The existence of a bankruptcy safety net for
more homeowners would help justify permitting them to mortgage
their homes despite their inability to properly assess the risk of a
home equity loan.4 23  Therefore, Chapter 13 debtors should be
permitted to modify their home equity loans to the same extent that
other secured loans may be modified.424 Similarly, Chapter 11
debtors should be permitted to modify home equity loans.
425
Other potential revisions to bankruptcy law are not so clearly
necessary. For example, a Chapter 7 debtor's right to redeem
tangible personal property held for personal, family, or household
use by paying the value of the property could be extended to permit
similar lien stripping of undersecured home equity loans.4 26 Part of
the reason for the provision permitting redemption of used
household items is the fact that their value to creditors is much lower
421. See Winn, supra note 170, at 597,616.
422. Payments could be reduced by lowering an above-market interest rate, by
extending the term of the loan, or by stripping down the lien where the loan amount was in
excess of the value of the home.
423. Professor Jackson gives the inability of debtors to properly assess the risk of
borrowing as one justification for the fresh start of bankruptcy. Jackson, supra note 55, at
1404-18.
424. See supra note 166 and accompanying text regarding Chapter 13 limitations on
modification. Modification of long-term home equity loans raises some issues not
applicable to modification of short-term loans in Chapter 13, because the term of a modified
home equity loan could exceed the term of the debtor's Chapter 13 plan. Current law
provides that a plan may not provide for payments extending beyond the term of the plan.
See 11 U.S.C. § 1322(c) (1988) (redesignated as subsection (d) by the Bankruptcy Reform
Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, § 301(1), 108 Stat. 4106, 4131). If long term-home
equity loans were subject to modification, some provision would have to be made for
payment periods extending beyond the term of the plan.
425. See supra note 165.
426. See supra note 289 and accompanying text.
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than their value to the debtor,427 whereas the value of real property to
both debtors and creditors is the property's market value.
42 8
Nevertheless, because the policies that support lien stripping of an
undersecured home equity loan in Chapter 13 are equally applicable
in the Chapter 7 context,4 29 Chapter 7 lien stripping of home equity
loans should be permitted. In any event, the issue is primarily
academic because of the relatively few instances in which debtors
would be able to pay a home equity lender the secured portion of a
home equity loan in cash.
Another possible revision to bankruptcy law would be to give
the debtor the ability to avoid non-purchase money liens against the
exempt portion of the homestead. However, this revision should not
be adopted because it would have a negative impact on credit
availability, especially in states with generous homestead
exemptions. The Bankruptcy Code does permit debtors to avoid
non-purchase money liens against certain types of exempt personal
property, but the reason for this provision is the low value of such
property to creditors in relation to the value to the debtor.
430
Although permitting a debtor to avoid home equity liens against
the exempt portion of the debtor's homestead would promote the
427. See supra note 293 and accompanying text.
428. A debtor may, however, place a sentimental value on the home.
429. See supra notes 418-421 and accompanying text. See generally Margaret
Howard, Dewsnupping the Bankruptcy Code, 1 J. BANKR. L. & PRAc. 513 (1992)
(criticizing the Supreme Court's opinion that prohibits lien stripping in Chapter 7 of loans
secured by real property).
430. See supra notes 290-293 and accompanying text. Professor Jackson makes a
compelling argument for the avoidance of liens against exempt property independent of this
rationale and without discussion of a limitation of the avoidance power to personal property.
See JACKSON, supra note 94, at 264-66; Jackson, supra note 55, at 1436-38. He justifies
apparent inconsistencies in bankruptcy that permit a debtor to sell exempt assets and receive
non-exempt proceeds, but provide for avoidance of a non-purchase money security interest
in an exempt asset. See JACKSON, supra note 94, at 265. He justifies the distinction as
follows:
When an individual sells an asset, he trades it for cash. In contrast, an individual
who grants a general security interest in an asset retains possession and use of the
asset but pledges to relinquish it upon the occurrence of a contingency-default-
the probability of which he may underestimate because of incomplete heuristics.
It is this latter aspect that makes the problem of security interests in exempt
property distinct from the problem of sale and suggests why one may not simply
be a lesser-included case of the other.
Id. Professor Jackson goes on to say that purchase money liens on exempt assets should not
be avoidable because the extension of credit helped the debtor obtain the exempt asset in the
first place. Id. at 266.
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fresh start policy, it would work against the availability of home
equity credit in some states.43' Creditors would refuse to make a
home equity loan that reduced the homeowners' equity to an amount
less than the amount of the permitted homestead exemption. This
factor would not seriously affect the availability of home equity
credit in those states with low homestead exemptions. In Florida, on
the other hand, where a homestead is defined by size and not limited
by value,4 32 home equity loans presumably would not be available
since debtors could avoid liens on their homesteads entirely by filing
bankruptcy. Therefore, federal law, at least as applied in Florida,
would essentially prohibit homeowners from borrowing against their
homes for purposes other than purchase of the home.433 Because of
the adverse effect on the availability of home equity credit in states
with generous homestead exemptions, debtors should not be
permitted to avoid liens against their homesteads in bankruptcy. In
summary, the Bankruptcy Code should be amended to permit
modification of a home equity loan in Chapter 11 or Chapter 13 and
to permit lien stripping of an undersecured home equity loan in
Chapter 7. It should not be amended to permit avoidance of liens
against the homestead.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Dunckels are some of the more fortunate victims of the
federal government's promotion of home equity financing. They
were able, though barely at times, to stay current in making
payments on their home mortgage loan, and they recently refinanced
their loan at a lower interest rate.434 While the Dunckels are happy
to still own their home, they are angry that federal law permitted a
lender to take advantage of their crisis. Many other Americans, who
431. See supra notes 353-357 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
balancing of the interests of credit availability and the fresh start.
432. See FLA. CONsT. art. X, § 4.
433. Texas law does just that by invalidating any lien other than a lien for purchase
money, home improvements, or taxes, see supra note 349 and accompanying text, but it is
unlikely that such a position could find support at the federal level. In debate over the Tax
Reform Act of 1986, Senators stressed over and over the importance of permitting
homeowners to borrow against their homes since the home is the most substantial asset of
most households. See supra notes 205-206 and accompanying text.
434. Telephone Interview with Gary Dunckel (Feb. 17, 1995).
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are not as fortunate as the Dunckels, have lost their homes to
foreclosure by a home equity lender.
The proposals set forth in this Article would establish a more
appropriate balance of the important federal policies affected by
home equity financing-home ownership, credit availability, and the
fresh start. Homeowners would be permitted to mortgage their
homes to obtain credit but would not be encouraged to do so with
artificial distinctions between deductible and nondeductible interest.
A more open credit market for Americans in all communities,
together with state and federal prohibitions against certain
unconscionable credit terms, would make fair credit available and
would provide protection to homeowners against particularly unfair
credit terms. Finally, the amendment of bankruptcy law to permit
modification and lien stripping of home equity loans would reinforce
the bankruptcy safety net for homeowners.
While each federal measure that promotes home equity
financing has unique objectionable repercussions, the measures have
in common a complete lack of justification under any rational federal
policy. Although the federal government legitimately attempts to
make credit available to the American public, there simply is no
valid federal policy served by encouraging borrowers and lenders to
choose the home equity loan structure for consumer borrowing over
another structure. Federal laws that promote home equity financing
work against the recognized federal policies favoring home
ownership and the fresh start in bankruptcy. While the economics of
a particular situation may dictate that a borrower should grant and a
lender should require a lien on the borrower's home to secure a
consumer loan, the federal government should not influence the
decision. Most Americans still believe that home ownership is the
American dream. Congress should not mortgage that dream by
encouraging homeowners to mortgage their homes to secure
borrowing not related to the home.
456 [Vol. 69
